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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to the provisions of Rule XIV(a) of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Article VIII Section 4 of the
Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(c).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IN
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519.
a.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that a client of the law firm of Jardine,
Linebaugh, Brown, & Dunn paid Respondent a personal bonus are
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page 4 Paragraphs

5 and 7 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
b.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that "Respondent chose to interpret this payment
as his own personal bonus and not the property of the law firm"
are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page 4,

Paragraph 6 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
c.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that "It has not been proved by clear or
convincing evidence that respondent's conduct in this matter rose
to the level of misappropriation, criminal conduct, dishonesty,
misappropriation, theft, fraud, or deceit as set forth in the
5

Applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, including 1.13(b) and
8.4(c)" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page

5, Paragraph 12 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
d.

Whether the Hearing Panel's conclusion of law and the

Board's Order affirming that "... the evidence has not been clear
nor convincing that this bonus was in fact a fee" are arbitrary,
capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page 5, of Panel findings and

Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
e.

Whether the Hearing Panel's recommendation and the

Board's Order affirming that "... we do not recommend sanctions
regarding this matter" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
erroneous.

(Page 5, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IN
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-520:
a.

Whether the Hearing Panel's implication and the Board's

Order affirming that the default entered in this case had been
waived or set aside are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
erroneous.

(Page 5, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
b.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that Mr. Yagi testified that some trust account
money was spent on stock for Mr. Cragun are arbitrary,
capricious, or clearly erroneous.
6

(Page 7, Paragraph 11. of

Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar)
c.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that "Respondent did prepare opinion letters and
other documents to facilitate stock purchase transactions for the
benefit of Mr. Cragun" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
erroneous.

(Page 8, Paragraph 15 of Panel findings and Rule XIV

of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
d.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affilming that all of the $25,000.00 received by Respondent
from Mr. Cragun was deposited in Respondent's trust account are
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page 8, Paragraph

17 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline
of the Utah State Bar)
e.

Whether the Hearing Panel's implication and the Board's

Order affirming that checks totaling $11,250.00 payable to Rick
Yagi and a check in the amount of $1,250.00 payable to Randy Yagi
from Respondent's trust account were funds spent for the benefit
of Mr. Cragun are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.
(Page 8, Paragraph 18 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
f.

Whether the Hearing Panel's recommendation and the

Board's Order affirming that Respondent receive no discipline
other than probation for one year and be required to complete a
course in ethics are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

7

(Page 9, and page 11 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
g.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that "The duty violated in this matter ... arose
out of inexperience and mistakes in judgment which can be
remedied" were arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.
(Page 9, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
h.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that "... Respondent's inadequate accounting of
Cragun's money was a matter of incompetence" rather than
intentional misconduct were arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
erroneous.

(Page 9, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar)
i.

Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's

Order affirming that it had not been shown by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent's conduct in the handling of
Mr. Cragun's money was due to criminal conduct, dishonesty,
intentional misappropriation, theft, fraud, or deceit, were
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

(Page 9, of Panel

findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar)
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
1.

Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the

Utah State Bar pertaining to the standard of review of cases
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
2.

Rule 1.13 (a)(b), SAFEKEEPING OF PROPERTY, of the

Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
3.

Rule 8.4(c), MISCONDUCT, of the Rules of

Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
4.

American Bar Association Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BY THE HEARING PANEL AND
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS
1.

This appeal is from a final Order entered by the Board

of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar on January 28, 1993,
wherein the Board affirmed the Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendations of a Hearing Panel of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah State Bar.
2.

This matter involves two complaints against the same

Respondent arising from separate instances of alleged
professional misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.

The Screening Panel members who

considered the facts of these cases found that there were
reasonable grounds to believe Respondent had violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct as alleged and voted to issue Formal
Complaints.
9

3.

Formal Complaint F-519 alleges that Respondent

misappropriated $4,200.00 from his law firm.

The Hearing Panel

found that Respondent was entitled to this money as a "personal
bonus" and found no misconduct associated with Respondent's
taking the money from his law firm.
4.

Formal Complaint F-520 alleges that Respondent

misappropriated approximately $19,000.00 from a client.

The

evidence presented at the hearing established that Respondent
misappropriated no less than $12,500.00 and as much as
$19,000.00.

Default was entered against the Respondent in Formal

Complaint F-520 and was never waived or set aside. Therefore,
the only issue before the Hearing Panel was the appropriate
sanction to be entered.

Prior to the hearing Respondent made

restitution to his client in the amount of $13,000.00. The
Hearing Panel recommended that Respondent be placed on probation
for one (1) year, be ordered to take a class in ethics, and make
restitution of an additional $13,000.00. Respondent no longer
practices law in Utah which renders the recommendation of
probation a nullity.

Respondent promised the Hearing Panel he

would make restitution of the remaining $13,000.00 prior to
December 31, 1992, but has not done so.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519
1.

On or about July 1, 1986, Mr. Blaine W. Savage retained

Respondent and the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn
(hereinafter "Law Firm"), to represent him in a civil matter.
10

These facts are admitted by Respondent in his Answer (hereinafter
"RA") filed herein.
2.

From on or about July 1, 1986, until on or about

December 10, 1986, Respondent provided legal services to Mr.
Savage on behalf of the Law Firm, RA.
3. A dispute arose between Respondent and the Law Firm as
to the terms of the fee agreement with Mr. Savage. However,
assuming Respondent's version of the facts to be true, the fee
agreement was at an hourly rate. Mr. Savage paid the Law Firm a
total of $10,000.00 for legal services in four payments.
4.

On or about October 1, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law

Firm the sum of $1,000.00 with check No. 1367 made payable to the
Law Firm, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A and
incorporated herein, RA.
5.

On or about November 5, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law

Firm the sum of $500.00 with check No. 1370 made payable to the
Law Firm, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B and
incorporated herein, RA.
6.

On or about December 7, 1986, Mr Savage paid the Law

Firm the sum of $3,500.00 with check No. 1374 made payable to
William R. Shupe and delivered to Respondent.

A copy of this

check is attached hereto as Appendix C and incorporated herein.
Respondent did not deliver the check or the proceeds of this
check to the Law Firm.

Instead, retained these funds and

converted them to his own use.

These facts were established by

the testimony of Kent B. Linebaugh and James M. Dunn who
11

testified that Respondent confessed to them that he had
wrongfully converted these funds to his own use.

(Record of

Hearing Pages 4 through 18)
7.

These facts were also established pursuant to Rule 8(d)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that
averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required are admitted when not denied.

These facts are pleaded

in Paragraph 5 of Section III of the Formal Complaint and no
responsive pleading thereto was filed.

These facts not being

denied are admitted.
8.

On or about December 10, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law

Firm the sum of $5,000.00 with check No. 1622. The check was
made payable to William R. Shupe and delivered to Respondent.

A

copy of this check is attached hereto as Appendix D and
incorporated herein.

Respondent paid the Law Firm the sum of

$4,300.00 from these funds and retained for himself the sum of
$700.00.

These facts are pleaded in Paragraphs 6 and 7, of

Section III of the Formal Complaint.
9.

Respondent does not deny that he personally retained the

sum of $4,200.00 from the proceeds received from Mr. Savage on
December 7 and December 10. Respondent confessed to Kent B.
Linebaugh and James M. Dunn that he converted these funds.
However, when the complaint was filed with the Bar, Respondent,
for the first time, alleged that he was entitled to these funds
as a personal bonus from Mr. Savage.
through 10, and pages 12 through 14)
12

(Record of trial pages 4

10.

On or about September 1, 1989, December 1, 1990, and

August 1, 1990, Respondent signed promissory notes payable to the
Law Firm in the principal sum of $4,200.00 plus interest.

These

notes were for the purpose of repaying to the Law Firm the amount
converted from the payments received from Mr. Savage.

These

promissory notes are attached here to as Appendices E, F, & G and
incorporated herein.

These facts are pleaded in Paragraphs 9,

10, and 11 of Section III of the Formal Complaint.

Respondent

admits in his Answer filed herein that he signed various
promissory notes payable to the Law Firm.
Formal Complaint F-519
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
THE FINDINGS OF THE HEARING PANEL ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS
1.

The finding of the Hearing Panel that payments to

Respondent on December 7, and December 10, 1986, by a client of
Respondent's law firm were personal bonuses to Respondent is
clearly erroneous.
2.

The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent

violated none of the Rules of Professional Conduct is clearly
erroneous.
3.

The recommendation that Respondent receive no discipline

as a result of his conduct giving rise to the charges in Formal
Complaint F-519 is clearly erroneous.

13

ARGUMENT
I
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT PAYMENTS TO
RESPONDENT ON DECEMBER 7, AND DECEMBER 10, 1986, BY
A CLIENT OF RESPONDENT'S LAW FIRM WERE PERSONAL
BONUSES TO RESPONDENT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Findings 5, 6, and 7 on page 4 of the Hearing Panel's
findings are clearly erroneous.

Finding 5 states "... Mr. Savage

paid to respondent what was termed by Mr. Savage as a vbonus for
you' arising out of what Mr. Savage believed to be a good result
from the representation".

Finding 6 states: "Respondent chose to

interpret this payment as his own personal bonus and not the
property of the law firm".

Finding 7 states:

"Mr. Savage also

intended this payment to be a vpersonal bonus'".
The finding that Mr. Savage intended this payment to be a
personal bonus to Respondent is not supported by any evidence of
record.

The finding that Respondent chose to interpret this

payment as a personal bonus is based only on the contradictory
testimony of Respondent.

This finding is contrary to

Respondent's confession to Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Savage, is
contrary to Respondent's confession at the hearing on this matter
as described hereafter, and is contrary to the evidence admitted
at the hearing.
Blaine Savage did not testify.
submit an Affidavit from Mr. Savage.

However, Respondent did
In this Affidavit Mr.

Savage states "As I prepared to pay my final legal bill,
(emphasis added) which would have been approximately $4,500.00
($6,000 less the $1,500 I had already paid), I told Mr. Shupe
14

that I wanted to pay the $10,000.00 I had budgeted and he could
consider the excess a bonus for his good work."

At no time did

Mr. Savage state to Respondent that "this is a bonus for you" or
that "this is a personal bonus". Respondent had been practicing
law long enough to know that money paid for representation by a
law firm belongs to the law firm, not the individual attorney.
Mr. Savage's Affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix H and
incorporated herein.

If Mr. Savage intended this to be a

personal bonus to Respondent why did he not say so in his
Affidavit?

It was stipulated between the parties at trial that

if Mr. Savage had been called as a witness he would not testify
that he told Respondent this was a personal bonus.

(Record of

hearing page 17)
Other evidence that shows these findings to be clearly
erroneous consists of the testimony of Respondent during the
hearing on this complaint.

During the hearing, Respondent

testified regarding his conversation with his client, Mr. Savage,
and the payment of his bill to the law firm.

Respondent,

referring to Mr. Savage, states: "He didn't say the words
'personal bonus'". Later in his testimony Respondent refers to
his conversation with Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn wherein he
states: "... when they confronted me with it, I admitted that I
had done wrong". (Record of hearing page 16)
Respondent's testimony bespeaks his state of mind when he
took the money belonging to his law firm when he stated "The firm
wasn't being damaged because it was receiving every cent of its
15

billing, and he was happy with me." (Record of hearing page 16)
In other words, he is justifying taking the money from his law
firm, with whom he has a fiduciary relationship, because the firm
will not miss the money.

Respondent then discloses what

motivated him to take the money when he stated:
"I think that there was some, probably, residual
feelings of resentment for sometimes being passed over
for things in the firm that were, perhaps, eating away
at me that made me, that allowed the situation to
appear proper, logical and okay." (Record of hearing
page 16)
This is also an admission that what he had done was not proper,
logical and okay.

Respondent later said "Believe me, I know I

did a wrong thing".

He later said "... I know that I messed up,

and that I should have disclosed it and given it to the firm."
(Record of hearing page 17)
Other evidence that shows the findings of the Hearing Panel
to be clearly erroneous consists of the testimony of Mr.
Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, the Affidavit of Mr. Savage, and the
physical evidence consisting of the dates and amounts of
payments.

Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn appeared and testified,

under oath, that when they confronted Respondent about this
matter Respondent confessed to them that he had improperly taken
the money.

They testified that Respondent never alleged that he

was entitled to the money or that it was a personal bonus. Upon
being confronted by Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, Respondent
confessed his misappropriation and signed Promissory Notes to
repay the funds he had taken. (Record of Hearing Pages 4 through

ID
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The evidence supports Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn's testimony
that Respondent misappropriated the funds. The evidence is not
consistent with Respondent's allegation that the funds were a
personal bonus.

In his Affidavit, Mr. Savage states that

Respondent was informed of the payment of a bonus on the date of
the making of the last payment.

The evidence shows that the last

payment was made on December 10, 1986, in the amount of
$5,000.00.

By this date. Respondent had already misappropriated

$3,500.00.

An interim payment of $3,500.00 was made on December

7, 1986 and Respondent kept the entire amount. When the final
payment was made on December 10, 1986, the one which contained
the "bonus". Respondent kept an additional $700.00. According to
Mr. Savage's Affidavit there was no mention to Respondent of a
bonus in connection with the interim payment of $3,500.00 kept by
Respondent.

These facts of record were pointed out to the

Hearing Panel.
II
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT
RESPONDENT VIOLATED NONE OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Finding 12 and the Conclusions of Law on page 5 wherein the
Panel found no violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
are clearly erroneous based on the evidence of record described
above.

Respondent's admissions in his Answer, and in his

admissions, his admissions to Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, and his
admissions before the Hearing Panel, establish the fact that he
accepted and retained the sum of $3,500.00 from a client of the
17

Law Firm on December 7, 1986 and retained the sum of $700.00 from
a payment made to him by a client of the Law Firm on December 10,
1992, for a total of $4,200.00. Respondent's admissions in his
Answer, and his admissions before the Hearing Panel, establish
that he kept the $4,200.00 and did not pay it to the Law Firm.
Respondent's admissions in his Answer, his confession to Kent B.
Linebaugh and James M. Dunn, and his confession to the Hearing
Panel. establish that he converted the sum of $4,200.00 to his
own use.
Respondent's admissions in his Answer, his admissions before
the Hearing PaneL, and Appendices E, F, & G, attached hereto,
establish that he signed several promissory notes to the Law Firm
wherein he agreed to repay the above-described funds. The
exhibits establish that the promissory notes were not signed
until over two years after the funds had been taken by
Respondent.
James M. Dunn and Kent B. Linebaugh testified that, in the
summer of 1989, they learned that funds paid by Mr. Savage to
Respondent had not been paid to the Law Firm.

Mr. Dunn and Mr.

Linebaugh testified that, in the summer of 1989, they confronted
Respondent about the missing funds and he confessed to them that
he had improperly taken the money and agreed to make restitution.
They further testified that Respondent admitted to them that the
taking of the funds was wrongful and he did not claim at that
time that the funds were a personal bonus. (Record of hearing
pages 4 through 14) After making these admissions, he signed the
18

various promissory notes described in the Formal Complaint.

If

Respondent truly believed he was legitimately entitled to this
money why did he confess that the money was improperly taken and
sign promissory notes to repay it?
Respondent's allegations that the payment of these funds was
a personal bonus is contrary to the evidence.

Respondent states

that the money he kept was paid to him as a bonus on the day the
case was settled.

He alleges the amount of his bonus was the

difference between the amount of the final bill from the Law Firm
and $10,000.00 which is the amount Mr. Savage was willing to pay
for the legal services.

The documents admitted into evidence

show that Respondent kept the money before the case was settled
and before the "bonus" was paid.

Respondent kept for himself the

sum of $3,500.00 on December 7, 1986, which was before the case
had been settled and before the day of the final payment to the
Law Firm.

Respondent did keep some money from the "bonus" paid

on the day of the settlement and final payment, December 10,
1986.

However, the amount he kept on that date was only $700.00.
Ill
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT RESPONDENT RECEIVE NO
DISCIPLINE AS A RESULT OF HIS CONDUCT GIVING
RISE TO THE CHARGES IN FORMAL COMPLAINT
F-519 IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

The finding that there was no harm to the public as valid
grounds for taking no disciplinary action against an attorney who
misappropriates funds from a law firm is clearly erroneous.
(Finding 11 on page 4)

In the case of North Carolina State Bar

19

v. Nelson,

9110NCSB789, October 6, 1992, an attorney received

payment for legal services which he failed to deliver to his law
firm because he believed the firm owed him money.

The Court held

that this constituted more than a simple partnership dispute and
amounted to dishonesty for which the lawyer was suspended for
nine months. A copy of this opinion is attached as Appendix I
and incorporated herein.
CONCLUSION
Respondent violated Rule 1.13(b), SAFEKEEPING OF PROPERTY,
and Rule 8.4(c), MISCONDUCT, of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.

Respondent converted money from the law firm with which

he was associated and to whom he owed a duty of good faith and
fair dealing.

He violated the trust and confidence placed in him

by his associates.

Disbarment or a substantial period of

suspension with full restitution as a condition precedent to
reinstatement is clearly warranted for this misconduct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519
1.

On or about January 1989, Bryant D. Cragun, entered into

negotiations with Mr. Rick Yagi for the acquisition of a publicly
held corporation.
2.

It was agreed between these parties that Mr. Cragun

would deposit $25,000.00 into Respondent's trust account to be
used for the sole purpose of acquiring a corporation satisfactory
to and approved by Mr. Cragun.
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3.

On or about January 19, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check

No. 1021 from WAC Research, one of Mr. Cragun's companies, in the
amount of $5,000.00, made payable to Respondent's trust account,
to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose stated above. A
copy of this check and Respondent's trust account deposit slip
are attached hereto as Appendix J and incorporated herein.

This

exhibit shows that the entire $5,000.00 was deposited into the
trust account.
4.

On or about January 30, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check

No. 491 from Wilmark Corporation, another of Mr. Cragun's
companies, in the amount of $5,000.00, payable to Respondent's
trust account, to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose
stated above. A copy of this check and Respondent's trust
account deposit slip are attached hereto as Appendix K and
incorporated herein.

This deposit slip shows that $4,925.00 was

deposited into the trust account and that Respondent kept $75.00
in cash.
5.

On or about February 2, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check

No. 1124 from Newcap Scientific Corp., another of Mr. Cragun's
companies, in the amount of $12,000.00, payable to Respondent's
trust account, to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose
stated above. A copy of this check and Respondent's trust
account deposit slip are attached hereto as Appendix L and
incorporated herein.

This deposit slip shows that $8,000.00 was

deposited into the trust account and that Respondent kept
$4,000.00 in cash.
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6.

On or about February 14, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check

No. 1125 from Newcap Scientific Corp. in the amount of $3,000.00,
payable to Respondent's trust account, to be delivered to
Respondent for the purpose stated above. A copy of this check
and Respondent's trust account deposit slip are attached hereto
as Appendix M and incorporated herein.

This deposit slip shows

that $2,500.00 was deposited into the trust account and that
Respondent kept $500.00 in cash.
7.

The above-described exhibits verify that instead of

depositing Mr. Cragun's $25,000.00 in his trust account, as he
was required to do. Respondent deposited only $20,425.00 and kept
cash for himself in the amount of $4,575.00. This was contrary
to the express instructions of Mr. Cragun and contrary to
Respondent's fiduciary duties as trustee of these funds.
Respondent converted the sum of $4,575.00 by withholding funds
that should have been placed in his trust account.

These facts

are unequivocally established by the record and were apparently
ignored by the Hearing Panel.
8.

After the above-described funds were delivered to

Respondent, Mr. Yagi failed to find a corporation satisfactory to
Mr. Cragun. Accordingly, on or about March 7, 1989, Mr. Cragun's
attorney directed Respondent to return the $25,000.00 he was
holding in trust for Mr. Cragun.
9.

On or about March 16, 1989 Respondent returned to Mr.

Cragun the sum of $6,000.00. On or about October 14, 1992, the
day before the hearing on this complaint, Respondent refunded an
22

additional $7,000.00.

Subsequently, he informed the Hearing

Panel that he would reimburse Mr. Cragun the additional sum of
$13,000.00 no later than December 31, 1992. Respondent did not
keep this promise to the Hearing Panel as evidenced by the
Affidavit of Robert J. Dale attached hereto as Appendix N and
incorporated herein.

The Board appears to have made it's

findings and recommendation partially in reliance upon
Respondent's promise to make this additional restitution.
10.

On or about March 2, 1990, Mr. Cragun obtained a

Default Judgment against Respondent in the Third Judicial
District Court for the conversion of the $19,000.00. A copy of
this default judgment is incorporated into the Formal Complaint
and was served on Respondent on or about December 30, 1991, in
the above-entitled action. A copy of the civil Complaint,
Default and Formal Complaint are attached hereto as Appendix 0
and incorporated herein.
11.

Respondent did not respond to the Formal Complaint and,

on February 12, 1992, he was served with a Notice of Intent to
Default.

He still did not respond to the Formal Complaint and on

March 5, 1992, Default was entered.

Copies of these documents

are attached hereto as Appendix P and incorporated herein.
12.

The facts set forth in the Formal Complaint are

established by Respondent's default in Civil Case No.
890903670CV, in the Third Judicial District Court, which default
is incorporated into the Formal Complaint, and also by
Respondent's Default to the Formal Complaint in the above23

entitled action. Additionally, Mr. Bryant D. Craoun testified as
to the validity of the facts in the Formal Complaint.
13.

The bank statement, showing the status of Respondent's

trust account at Continental Bank, now West One Bank, for the
period of January 31, 1989 through February 28, 1989, verifies
that by the end of February, 1989, the balance of the trust
account was only $5,940.48. This means that of the $20,425.00,
deposited in trust for Mr. Cragun, $14,484.52 was gone in less
than 30 days.

This is in addition to the $4,575.00 that was

previously converted.

A copy of this document is attached as

Appendix 0 and incorporated herein.

In spite of these facts the

Hearing Panel did not find Respondent's conduct to be
intentional.
14.

Notwithstanding that the above stated facts had been

established by two defaults, the Office of Bar Counsel offered
Respondent the opportunity, in or about March, 1992, to account
for these funds as a matter in extenuation or mitigation.
Respondent accounted for only about $5,000.00 of the missing
funds.

The facts and applicable violations of the Rules of

Professional Conduct have been judicially established by default
as well as by clear and convincing evidence admitted at the
trial.
15.

Based on the Default, which was never set aside,

Respondent had the burden to submit matters in extenuation,
mitigation or explanation as to how or why these funds were
converted.

He offered no mitigation or extenuation other than
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personal problems.

The law is unequivocal that personal problems

are not justification or excuse for theft, Matter of Bell, Infra.
16.

The facts established by the testimony of Mr. Cragun

and Mr. Yagi were that the negotiations for the acquisition of a
corporation were between Mr. Cragun and Mr. Yagi, that
Respondent's involvement was that of trustee of Mr. Cragun's
funds.

Assuming Respondent's version of the facts to be true, he

was to deposit all of those funds in his trust account and only
disburse them for the purpose of purchasing a corporation for Mr.
Cragun.

The facts of record are that Respondent did not deposit

the entire $25,000.00 in his trust account, but that he withheld
$4,575.00 in cash, that Mr. Cragun never approved the purchase of
any corporation, that no stock in any corporation was given or
tendered to Mr. Cragun and that, when Respondent's services were
terminated, he returned only $6,000.00 to Mr. Cragun.
17.

During the course of the trial, Respondent attempted to

account for the missing $19,000.00 by alleging that stock had
been purchased for Mr. Cragun.

In support of that allegation,

Respondent offered into evidence stock certificates of National
Thoroughbred Corporation that contained nothing on their face to
indicate when they were purchased or for whom they were
purchased.

In rebuttal, Mr. Cragun testified these stock

certificates were not purchased for him, that he had never heard
of National Thoroughbred Corporation, and he was never provided
stock in this or any corporation by Respondent or Mr. Yagi.

Mr

Yagi also testified the most he had ever been given by Respondent
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from the Cragun funds was $5,000.00 which was for expenses, not
for the purchase of stock.
18.

Respondent also provided a letter he had written on

September 21, 1992, wherein he lists checks from his trust
account totaling $19,250.00.

In that letter Respondent states

that he and Mr. Yagi had together identified these checks as
being checks that were issued on behalf of Mr. Cragun. At the
trial Mr. Yagi refuted Respondent's letter by testifying he had
not assisted Respondent in identifying the checks listed in his
letter and by reaffirming his Affidavit that the most he had ever
received from Respondent's trust account for Mr. Cragun was
$5,000.00 and that was for expenses not for stock.
Formal Complaint F-520
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
THE FINDINGS OF THE HEARING PANEL ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS
1.

The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent

prepared opinion letters and other documents to facilitate the
purchase of stock for his client are clearly erroneous.
2.

The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent

received only $1250.00 from the funds on deposit in his trust
account for the benefit of Mr. Cragun is clearly erroneous.
3.

The implication of the Hearing Panel that checks payable

to Rick Yagi from his trust account in the amount of $11,250.00
were legitimate expenses on behalf of his client Mr. Cragun is
clearly erroneous.
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4.

The Hearing Panel's findings that the misappropriation

of Mr. Cragun's funds by Respondent is explained by inexperience
and incompetence are clearly erroneous.
5.

The matters set forth in Formal Complaint F-520 are

established by default.
6.

The default was never set aside.

The Hearing Panel's finding, and recommendation, that

the appropriate sanction is an admonition and a class in ethics
is clearly erroneous.
I
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT RESPONDENT
PREPARED OPINION LETTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
TO FACILITATE THE PURCHASE OF STOCK FOR HIS
CLIENT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Finding 15 on page 8 is clearly erroneous.
states:

This finding

"Respondent did prepare opinion letters and other

documents to facilitate stock purchase transactions for the
benefit of Mr. Cragun.'• The only testimony in support of this
finding is the testimony of Respondent and some letters dated
March 21, 1989, that he introduced into evidence with the
explanation that these were opinion letters written to facilitate
the purchase of stock for Mr. Cragun.

These letters are attached

as Appendix R.
The evidence which shows this finding to be clearly
erroneous consists of the testimony of Mr. Cragun, Mr. Yagi, and
the letters themselves.

The letters bear nothing on their face

to show they were written for the benefit of Mr. Cragun.
Further, the letters were dated March 21, 1989. Mr. Cragun
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terminated his relationship with Respondent on or before March
16, 1989, and demanded the return of the money being held in
trust by Respondent in his trust account.

Respondent refunded

the balance of the money remaining in his trust account,
$6,000.00, on March 16, 1989, before the letters were allegedly
written for Mr. Cragun.
It is inconceivable that Respondent would continue to
purchase stock for Mr. Cragun after he had cancelled the
agreement and demanded the return of his money.

Additionally,

Mr. Cragun testified that he was never informed by Respondent or
Mr. Yagi that they had purchased any stock in any corporation on
his behalf, they never provided him any stock and he had never
heard of National Thoroughbred Corporation, the corporation
allegedly purchased for Mr. Cragun. (Record of Hearing Pages 89
through 91) Mr. Yagi testified that he only received $5,000.00
from Respondent's trust account in connection with his dealings
for Mr. Cragun was for expenses not for the purchase of stock.
(Record of Hearing Pages 63 through 89)
II
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT RESPONDENT
RECEIVED ONLY $1250.00 FROM THE FUNDS ON
DEPOSIT IN HIS TRUST ACCOUNT FOR THE BENEFIT
OF MR. CRAGUN IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Portions of finding 18 on page 8 are clearly erroneous.
This finding states:
Yagi received approximately $5,000 for expenses. Shupe
received a fee of $1,250. There were presented by the
bar copies of checks totaling $11,250 all of which was
paid to Yagi except $1,250.00 paid to Yagi's brother,
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Randy Yagi, for expenses. Records were not kept
documenting the reasons for these disbursements.
Two portions of this finding are clearly erroneous.

The first is

the finding and implication that Respondent received only
$1,250.00 of the funds entrusted to him by Mr. Cragun.

The

evidence of record shows that Respondent drafted a check payable
to himself from his trust account in this amount on or about
January 19, 1989. A copy of this check is attached hereto as
Appendix S and incorporated herein.

The Office of Bar Counsel

does not dispute that Respondent paid himself this amount in
fees.

However, the evidence of record shows that, in addition

to the $1,250.00 which Respondent paid to himself from the trust
account, Respondent also received $4,575.00 from funds paid to
him by Mr. Cragun that were never deposited in his trust account.
The record showing that Respondent received $4,575.00 in
cash consists of the trust account deposit slips relating to the
four payments made to Respondent by Mr. Cragun.

Respondent was

given checks from Mr. Cragun totaling $25,000.00 for deposit into
his trust account.

He deposited only $20,425.00 and kept cash

for himself in the amount of $4,575.00. These documents were
admitted into evidence at the Hearing.

At the Hearing Respondent

was asked about this cash he had retained from the deposits.

In

each instance he claimed that he gave this cash to Mr. Yagi.
(Record of Hearing Pages 99 through 100)
This explanation is inconsistent with the evidence. When
Respondent's services were terminated my Mr. Cragun, on or before
March 16, 1989, he refunded $6,000.00 to Mr. Cragun leaving
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unaccounted for the sum of $19,000.00.

In his letter of

September 21, 1992, Respondent explained that the missing
$19,000.00 belonging to Mr. Cragun was fully accounted for by the
checks listed in the letter.

If Respondent's allegations are

true, that the entire $19,000.00 is accounted for in the checks
listed in his letter of September 21, 1992, then is testimony
that he gave Mr. Yagi almost $5,000.00 in cash is false.

If he

gave Mr. Yagi almost $5,000.00 in cash then his allegation that
the missing $19,000.00 is accounted for in the checks listed in
his letter of September 21, 1992, is false.
Both of Respondent's contradictory explanations conflict
with the testimony of Mr. Yagi which was that he never got more
than $5,000.00 from Respondent's trust account and he made no
mention of these payments being in currency.

Mr. Yagi never

specifically stated whether he got the money in cash or checks,
however, in reading his testimony, he said he went to Mr. Shupe
when he needed money for the Cragun deal and Mr. Shupe gave him
money out of his trust account. (Record of Hearing page 65) The
plain meaning of this testimony is that he funds were paid to him
by check from the trust account.

It would indeed be a

coincidence that Respondent happened to be depositing a check
from Mr. Cragun each time Mr. Yagi needed money so that cash
could be obtained from the deposit in lieu of issuing him a
check.

It is also important to note that in his letter of

September 21, 1992, Respondent claims that all of the money paid
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to Mr. Yagi was paid by check.

He makes no mention of ever

having given Mr. Yagi any cash.
Respondent never provided any evidence, other than his
unsubstantiated allegation, that the cash he took from the
deposit of Mr. Cragun's checks was spent on behalf of Mr. Cragun.
In fact, the record contradicts Respondent's testimony regarding
his disposition of this cash.

This misappropriation of funds was

apparently ignored by the Hearing Panel.
Ill
THE IMPLICATION OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT CHECKS
PAYABLE TO RICK YAGI FROM RESPONDENT'S TRUST
ACCOUNT IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,250.00 WERE
LEGITIMATE EXPENSES ON BEHALF OF
MR. CRAGUN IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The implication that checks, totaling $11,250.00, paid to
Rick Yagi and a check in the amount of $1,250.00 paid to Yagi's
brother, Randy Yagi, were disbursements made on behalf of Mr.
Cragun is clearly erroneous. Mr. Yagi testified and submitted an
Affidavit to the effect that the most he received from Respondent
on behalf of Mr. Cragun was $5,000.00. (Record of Hearing Page 64
and page 76) He further testified that he did a lot of deals
with Respondent for which he received funds from Respondent's
trust account and that they were unrelated to this deal with Mr.
Cragun.

Many checks to Mr. Yagi from Respondent bore notations

to indicate they were unrelated to Mr. Cragun.

Therefore, it was

clearly erroneous for the Hearing Panel to conclude or imply that
Respondent gave Mr. Yagi more than $5,000.00 of Mr. Cragun's
money.

There is virtually no evidence that Mr. Yagi's brother
31

was ever given any funds from the trust account for the benefit
of Mr. Cragun.
IV
THE HEARING PANEL'S FINDINGS THAT THE
MISAPPROPRIATION OF MR. CRAGUN'S FUNDS
BY RESPONDENT IS EXPLAINED BY INEXPERIENCE
AND INCOMPETENCE ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The Hearing Panel's findings on page 9 of their Findings to
the effect that the misappropriation of Mr. Cragun's funds is
explained by inexperience and incompetence are clearly erroneous.
There is no evidence of record to support a finding of negligence
or incompetence.

The evidence shows that about $5,000.00 was

paid to Mr. Yagi, Respondent paid himself $1,250.00 by check and
$6,000.00 was returned to Mr. Cragun on March 16, 1989. Taking
the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent, by assuming
these payments to Mr. Yagi and Respondent were legitimate
expenditures, this accounts only for $12,250.00 or less than half
of the $25,000.00 given to Respondent.
The evidence that shows Respondent misappropriated no less
than $12,750.00. He did this by skimming $4,575.00 from the four
payments given him for deposit in the trust account, as evidenced
by his trust account deposit slips. This leaves a balance of
$8,175.00 which was missing from the trust account.

Respondent

provided no evidence to show it was spent for the benefit of Mr.
Cragun and there is no evidence in the record that Respondent
spent this money through inexperience, mistake, or incompetence.
The money was inexplicably missing.
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This is conversion as a

matter of law, Nebraska State Bar v. Veith, 470 N.W.2d 549 (Neb.
1991).

A copy of this case was provided to the Hearing Panel and

is attached hereto as Appendix T and incorporated herein.
V
THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN FORMAL COMPLAINT
F-520 WERE ESTABLISHED BY DEFAULT AND THE
DEFAULT WAS NEVER SET ASIDE.
The matters set forth in Formal Complaint F-520 were
established by default.
Hearing Panel.

The default was never set aside by the

The Office of Bar Counsel never waived the

default but did give Respondent wide latitude to present matters
in extenuation and mitigation.
On page 5 of their findings the Hearing Panel implies that
the Office of Bar Counsel waived the entry of the Default
Judgment in this case.

This conclusion is clearly erroneous.

During the course of the Hearing Respondent made a verbal Motion
to Set Aside the Default.

The Hearing Panel denied the verbal

motion and informed Respondent that if he wanted to make such a
motion that he should do so in writing.
44)

(Record of Hearing page

Respondent never submitted a written motion to set aside the

default.

The Office of Bar Counsel has always proceeded on this

case under the belief that the allegations in the Formal
Complaint were already established and that this was a Sanctions
Hearing.

If it was the intention of the Hearing Panel to set

aside the default they should have specifically done so and
afforded the Office of Bar Counsel the opportunity to try this
case accordingly.
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Formal Complaint F-520 incorporates by reference a default
judgment entered against Respondent in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Appendix 0.

In this judgment Respondent was

found to have wrongfully converted the funds of Mr. Cragun which
entitled Mr. Cragun to punitive damages in the amount of
$100,000.00.
VI
THE HEARING PANEL'S FINDING, AND RECOMMENDATION,
THAT THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION IS AN ADMONITION
AND A CLASS IN ETHICS IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS,
AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
This recommendation of the Hearing Panel is inconsistent.
If Respondent's misconduct is explained by incompetence and
inexperience then why did the Hearing Panel require that he take
a course in ethics?

If the Hearing Panel really believed that

incompetence and inexperience explains his conduct then he should
be required to take a course in law office management.
The appropriate sanction, considering that there were
multiple acts of misappropriation and considering the amount of
money involved, is disbarment absent strong mitigating or
extenuating circumstances.

With strong mitigating and

extenuating circumstances, Respondent should receive no less than
a substantial period of suspension with restitution as a
condition precedent to reinstatement.
mitigation or extenuation.
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There is no strong

The fact that Respondent made restitution of an additional
$7,000.00 the day before the trial is not mitigation.

The

commentary in ABA Standard 9.4 states:
Lawyers who make restitution only after a disciplinary
proceeding has been instituted against them, however,
cannot be regarded as acting out of a sense of
responsibility for their misconduct, but, instead, as
attempting to circumvent the operation of the
disciplinary system, (emphasis added)
The guidelines for imposing sanctions in attorney discipline
cases are set forth in the American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and were adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of In Re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989)
Standard 3.0 of the American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that the factors to be
considered in imposing sanctions include the duty violated, the
lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused, and
the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

Standard

4.11 states: Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.

The least amount of discipline described in

this section is Standard 4.14 dealing with admonitions and states
that an admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is
negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no
actual or potential injury to a client.

There is virtually no

evidence that Respondent's conduct regarding the money he took
from his law firm or the money he took from Mr. Cragun was the
result of negligence.

There is no evidence to support the

conclusion that Respondent's failure to return or account for all
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of Mr. Cragun's money constituted little or no actual or
potential injury.

There is no evidence to support the conclusion

that Respondent's theft of the money from his law firm caused
little or no harm to the firm.
Standard 5.11(b) of the American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that disbarment is generally
appropriate when a lawyer engages in any intentional misconduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.
Standard 7.1 states: Disbarment is generally appropriate
when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of
a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit
for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
Standard 9.22 sets forth the matters that can be considered
in aggravation.

These include, dishonest or selfish motive and a

pattern of misconduct.

The evidence in Formal Complaint F-520

conclusively established that Respondent converted no less than
512,750.00.

Additionally, the facts in Formal Complaint F-519

show that Respondent misappropriated funds with which he was
entrusted that were the property of his former law firm.

These

two cases show a pattern of misconduct that demand disbarment or
other severe sanction.
Standard 9.22 also states that another matter to be
considered in aggravation is a Respondent's refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.
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In both

F-519 and F-520, Respondent has refused to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his misconduct in the face of overwhelming
evidence.

A person who cannot or will not recognize that he is

engaging in prohibited conduct will repeat that conduct if
afforded the opportunity to do so.
In the Matter of Bell, 596 A.2d 752 (N.J. 1991), the Supreme
Court of the State of New Jersey found that knowing
misappropriation of funds, even though the use of the funds was
not for the attorney's personal gain, was grounds for disbarment
despite severe personal problems being experienced by the
attorney.

A copy of this case is attached hereto as Appendix U

and incorporated herein.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska found

that misappropriation of funds is grounds for disbarment.

The

court also found that the act of conversion is complete when the
trust account balance falls below the amount that should be in
the account for the client.
N.W.2d 549 (Neb. 1991).

Nebraska State Bar v. Veith, 470

The Supreme Court of California held

that misappropriation of client funds warrants disbarment in Grim
v. The State Bar of California, 805 P.2d 941 (CA 1991).

A copy

of this case is attached as Appendix V and incorporated herein.
On March 8, 1993 the Board of Bar Commissioners entered an
Order and Recommendation for Discipline in the case of Churchy v.
Wahlquist, F-484 wherein they recommended disbarment based upon
two incidents of misappropriation of funds.

A copy of this

Order is attached as Appendix W and incorporated herein.

The

action taken in the Wahlcruist case was clearly appropriate.
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The

even handed administration of attorney discipline demands that
Mr. Shupe receive substantially the same discipline as Mr.
Wahlquist.
These cases show that states from the east coast through the
midwest to the west coast have adopted and follow the rule that
misappropriation of funds warrants disbarment.

The Office of Bar

Counsel submits that the citizens of the State of Utah have every
right to expect that attorneys in this State will be held to the
same high standards as the attorneys in our sister states.
CONCLUSION
The facts and law applicable to Formal Complaints F-519
and F-520 lead to the just and proper conclusion that the
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Hearing Panel
are clearly erroneous.

There is also a substantial indication

that the Hearing Panel entered its recommendation of discipline
based upon Respondent's promise to reimburse Mr. Cragun the sum
of $13,000.00 not later than December 31, 1992. Respondent
failed to keep that promise.

The appropriate sanction to be

entered against Respondent is disbarment, or a substantial period
of suspension with restitution, and payment of costs. As a
minimum Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law
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for not less than two (2) years with full restitution as a
condition precedent to reinstatement.
DATED this /jKT^&ay

of $?*?/ ^

, 1993.

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

fendell K. Smith
Assistant Bar Counsel
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APPENDIX R

FILED
APR 2 1 1993
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST CO.
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, NJ 07044
RE:

DELIVERY OF STOCK CERTIFICATES AND ESCROW ACCOUNT

Dear Mr. Manger:
Pursuant to the ten (10) enclosed opinion letters for Mssrs.
Goldberg; Hammond; Jacobson; Lake; Lieberman; Mauro; Pagano;
Rinaldi; Rosenthal; and Zipern (the "Shareholders"), I will inform
you that the share certificates you issued to the Shareholders will
be delivered to my escrow account.
As soon as the shares
represented by the share certificates are sold, Mr. Yagi will
arrange for payment therefor in the amount of thirty-five thousand
dollars ($35,000).
Your cooperation
appreciated.

is

assisting

the

Shareholders

Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

is

greatly

March 21, 1989

Mr, Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Bernard
C. Zipern; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion11) as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Zipern 1 s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Zipern paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Zipern on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Zipern in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Zipernfs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Zipernfs holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Seymour
Rosenthal; Number of Shares held: 44,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members
of Mr. Rosenthalfs immediate family or others have sold any
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Rosenthal paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rosenthal on
July 25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Rosenthal in excess of
three (3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members
of Mr. Rosenthal's immediate family or others have sold any
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d)8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rosenthalfs holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07 04 4
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank
Rinaldi; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Frank Rinaldi (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank Rinaldi which are relevant
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The following
representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldi f s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company1s
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Rinaldi paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rinaldi on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Rinaldi in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldi f s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr- Rinaldi!s holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank X.
Pagano; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Frank X. Pagano (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank X. Pagano which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Paganofs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Pagano!s immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Pagano paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Pagano on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Pagano in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Pagano's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Paganofs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Paganofs holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Salvatore
Mauro; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Salvatore Mauro (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Salvatore Mauro which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ;
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Mauro's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Mauro' s immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90)* days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5*
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Mauro paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Mauro on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Mauro in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ;
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Mauro's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Mauro's immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8, That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Mauro f s holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Daniel L.
Liberman; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Liberman's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Liberman!s immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;

Mr. Hyman Manger
New Jersey Transfer
March 21, 1989
Page 2

5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Liberman paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Liberman on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Liberman in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Liberman f s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Libermanfs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Liberman's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Walter J.
Lake, Sr.; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ;
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr.
Lake f s immediate family or others have sold any shares of the
Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company!s
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr- Lake paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 1985,
and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date free
and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present time;
and
7. That Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Lake on July 25,
1985, and have been held by Mr. Lake in excess of three (3)
years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ;
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr.
Lake's immediate family or others have sold any shares of the
Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently onemillion
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That: Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Lake's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Marc
Jacobson; Number of Shares held: 50,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Marc Jacobson (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Marc Jacobson which are relevant
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The following
representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson!s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Jacobsonfs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6- That Mr. Jacobson paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Jacobson on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Jacobson in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Jacobsonfs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Jacobson's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Jacobson's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989
Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 0704 4
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Richard
Hammond; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Richard Hammond (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Richard Hammond which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Hammond paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Hammond on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Hammond in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Hammond's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

March 21, 1989

Mr- Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 0704 4
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Harvey M.
Goldberg; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Goldberg paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr, Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Goldberg on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Goldberg in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. Tha^t Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Goldberg's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)

Salt Lake City, Utah
1 September 1989

$5,344.75

Promissory Note
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R. SHUPE, whose
addness is 7050 Union Park Boulevard, Suite 545, Midvale, Utah
84047 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE,
LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, and to any
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the
United States of America, the principal" amount of Five Thousand
Three Hundred Forty-four and 75/100ths Dollars
($5,344.75),
together with interest on the declining unpaid principal balance
hereunder at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date
hereof until paid, according to the terms and conditions that are
set forth in this promissory note (this "Note"):
1. Payments. Maker shall pay Holder (a) quarterly interest
installments of $133.62 each on 1 December 1989, 1 March 1990 and
1 June 1990 and (b) the total unpaid principal balance hereof,
together with all interest that is due thereon, on or before 1
September 1990.
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments.
Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid
principal balance of this Note, all accrued but unpaid interest
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinguent
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition
precedent to curing the default.
3. Application of Payments.
All payments and prepayments
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward
reduction of the principal balance.
4. Prepayment.
The outstanding principal balance hereof,
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty.
Maker's
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the
obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next

obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount
of such installments shall be applied in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note.
5.

Security,

This Note is unsecured.

6. Default. Maker shall be in default under this Note if a
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made
within five* (5) days after the due date of such payment.
If
default does so occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or
after judgment.
7. Assignability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's
prior written consent.
Notwithstanding any such assumption,
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for

the performance of all of

the

obligations

under

this

Note.

8- Waiver.
Holder may accept late payments or partial
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights
under this Note.
9. Liability of Parties Under Note.
The makers, sureties,
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available
to Holder.
10.
Interpretation; Jurisdiction.
The provisions of this
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance
with the
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be
independent and severable.
The invalidity or partial invalidity
of any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note.
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to
induce
Holder
to extend
those
accommodations, the
parties
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the
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connection with this Note.
11* Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction. All of the
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time.
This Promissory Note replaces a Promissory Note of 1 December
1990 in the principal amount of $5,669.42

UM4Q£Office Address:
92 3 Executive Park Drive, #C
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Home Address:
46 West 300 South, #1702
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
KBL\d\0166
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Salt Lake City, Utah
1 December 19 9 0

$5,669.42

Promissory Note
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R- SHUPE, whose
address is 923 Executive Park Drive, #C, Salt Lake City, Utah
841<|7 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE,
L.INERAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL, CORPORATION, and to any
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the
United States of America, the principal amount of Five Thousand Six
Hundred Sixty-nine and 42/100ths Dollars ($5,669.42), together with
interest on the declining unpaid principal balance hereunder at the
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date hereof until
paid, according to the terms and conditions that are set forth in
this promissory note (this "Note"):
1. Payments.
Maker shall pay Holder monthly interest
installments of $47.25 each on January 1, 1991 and the same day of
each consecutive calendar month thereafter until June 1, 1991, when
the entire"principal balance, together with all interest that is
due thereon, shall be due and payable in full.
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments.
Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid
principal balance of this Note, all accrued but unpaid interest
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinquent
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition
precedent to curing the default.
3. Application of Payments.
All payments and prepayments
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward
reduction of the principal balance.
4. Prepayment.
The outstanding principal balance hereof,
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty.
Maker's
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the

obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount of
such installments shall be applied in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note.
5.

Security.

This Note is unsecured.

6. Default, Maker shall be in default under this Note if a
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made
within five (5) days after the due date of such payment.
if
default does eo occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or
after judgment.
7. Assumability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's
prior written consent.
Notwithstanding any such assumption,
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for
the performance of all of the obligations under this Note.
8- Waiver.
Holder may accept late payments or partial
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights
under this Note.
9. Liability of Parties Under Note. The makers, sureties,
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available
to Holder.
10. Interpretation; Jurisdiction.
The provisions of this
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance with the
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be
independent and severable. The invalidity or partial invalidity of
any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note.
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to
induce Holder to extend those accommodations, the parties
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in

connection with this Note.
11. Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction.
All of the
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time.
This Promissory Note replaces a Promissory Note of 1 September
1989 in the principal amount of $5,344.75.

WILLIAM R.

$£fUPE

Office Address:
923 Executive Park Drive, #C
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Home Address:
46 West 300 South, #1702
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101.
KBL\d\0129
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Salt Lake City, Utah
1 August 1991

$5,669.42

Promissory Note
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R. SHUPE, whose
address is 923 Executive Park Drive, #C, Salt Lake City, Utah
84107 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE,
LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, and to any
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the
United States of America, the principal amount of Five Thousand Six
Hundred Sixty-Nine and 42/100ths Dollars ($5,669.42), together with
interest on the declining unpaid principal balance hereunder at the
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date hereof until
paid, according to the terras and conditions that are set forth in
this promissory note (this "Note"):
1. Payments.
Maker shall pay Holder monthly interest
installments of $47-25 each on September 1, 1991 and the same day
of each consecutive calendar month thereafter until November 1,
1991, when the entire principal balance, together with all interest
that is due thereon, shall be due and payable in full.
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments.
Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid
principal balance of this Note, ^11 accrued -but unpaid interest
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinquent
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition
precedent to curing the default.
3. Application of Payments. All payments and prepayments
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward
reduction of the principal balance.
4. Prepayment.
The outstanding principal balance hereof,
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty.
Maker's
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the

obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount of
such installments shall be applied in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note.
5.

Security.

This Note is unsecured.

6. Default. Maker shall be in default under this Note if a
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made
within* five (5) days after the due date of such payment.
If
default does so occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or
after judgment.
7. Assumability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's
prior written consent.
Notwithstanding any such assumption,
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for
the performance of all of the obligations under this Note.
8. Waiver.
Holder may accept late payments or partial
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights
under this Note.
9. Liability of Parties Under Note. The makers, sureties,
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available
to Holder.
10. Interpretation; Jurisdiction.
The provisions of this
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance with the
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be
independent and severable. The invalidity or partial invalidity of
any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note.
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to
induce Holder to extend those accommodations, the parties
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in
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jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in
connection with this Note.
11. Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction.
All of the
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time.

WILLIAM R. SHUPE
c:\rht\a\l59
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APPENDIX H

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In the Matter of
the Complaint by
KENT LINEBAUGH
against

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF BLAINE
SAVAGE
F-519

WILLIAM R. SHUPE

I, Blaine Savage, state the following of my own personal knowledge:
1.

In approximately 1986, I approached Mr. William Shupe to assist

me in a dispute with the general partner of two partnerships with
which I was associated.

2.

I felt that the general partner of these partnerships had

violated

numerous securities laws and that

I had a chance of

unwinding the partnership, or best case of getting my investment
back from the partnership.

3-

In our initial conversation, I told Mr. Shupe that I had

budgeted approximately $10,000 for legal fees.

He told me that he

would bill me on an hourly rate, which was approximately $100 per
hour-

I understood that this was an hourly case and not meant to

be a case that paid a percentage of settlement.

Other than Mr.

Shupe, I never spoke with any other attorney in his law office

regarding legal fees or any other substantive matter in my case.

4.

Mr. Shupe sent progress billings to me.

5-

I paid two checks of

$1,000 and $500

negotiations with the general partner.

during the course of our

I realized that litigation

could erupt in this matter, which would have drawn out the eventual
resolution for some time at considerable expense.

6.

I knew that Mr. Shupe and other members of his firm were

spending time on my case and I felt that we were making progress.

7.

In October of 1986 we finally reached a tentative settlement

with

the general partner.

We set to close the settlement in

December.

8.

On

the

day

of closing, Mr. Shupe

settlement documents.

arrived

with

numerous

Included in the settlement documents was a

final billing for approximately $6,000, representing the amount the
law firm billed my for my case.

9.

As I prepared to pay my final legal bill, which would have been

approximately $4,500 ($6,000 less the $1,500 I had already paid),
I told Mr. Shupe that I wanted to pay the $10,000 I had budgeted
and he could consider the excess a bonus for his good work.

10-

I then paid the additional $4,000 to Mr. Shupe.

11.

1 was aware that this payment was in excess of the billing,

but I felt the law firm was receiving the full amount of its billed
fees with

the

final

$4,500 payment-

I

feel that

I have no

remaining obligation to either Mr. Shupe or the Jardine law firm.

12.

On or about March 15, 1989, I received a letter from Mr.

Harold Reiser of the Jardine law firm.

He set forth several

statements in this letter relative to my association with the law
firm and Mr. Shupe.

I did not completely read this letter, but

rather sent it to my attorney and asked him to deal with the law
firm.

I received no other correspondence from the Jardine firm.

I do not agree with the contents of the letter sent to me since I
did not read it.

Dated this I (&_ day of

V—^-^

eQ,

, 1992.

A

a v_y

Blaine Savage

APPENDIX I

JAM 13 '92 10-42: MC STATE BAR

FILED

NO. 9110NCSB789
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OP APPEALS
Filed:

6 October 1992

r.t«

sfSALf
.iV-i

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
From the Disciplinary
Hearing Commission of the
North Carolina si-^i-o ParNo. 89 DHC 34

v.
EDWARD DANIELS NELSON

Appeal by defendant from order filed 23 January 1991 by
Chairman John Shaw before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of
the North Carolina state Bar.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 27

August 1992.
In June 1983 the appellant began practicing law with the New
Bern

law

firm

of

Beaman,

Kellum

& Stallings

(firm) •

The

Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC) found that at the time the
appellant was hired, the firm was organized as a professional
association" and all stocJc was held by Norman Kellum and Joseph
Stallings. During the summer of 1984 Kellum and Stallings met with
the appellant to discuss the possibility of the appellant becoming
an owner in the firm. Appellant's account of what transpired there
differed substantially from separate testimony given by Kellum,
Stallings and Bill Hollows, an associate with the firm.
Stallings testified that in June of 1984 Hollows approached
him and said that he and the appellant would liKe to meet with
Stallings and Kellum at the end of the day.

Stallings agreed and

the four men had a brief meeting later that evening.

Kellum,

Stallings and Hollows each testified that Hollows was present and
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-2began the meeting by stating that he and the appellant wished to
talk about becoming part owners in the firm.

Kellum and Stallings

voiced no objection to the idea of Hollows and the appellant
becoming owners, but said they would need to discuss it further.
Stallings said he would draft some documents for purposes of
discussion and get back with the appellant and Hollows. The men
also discussed the possibility of changing the firm's name. Upon
conclusion of the meeting Kellum, Stallings and Hollows each
believed that Hollows and the appellant remained employees of the
firm.
Stallings

further

testified

that

in

late

fall

of

1984

appellant asked Stallings how the paperwork was coming along.
Stallings told the appellant that he had turned the responsibility
for drafting the necessary documents over to Hollows and that the
matter was in Hollows' hands. Hollows testified that the appellant
asked him on more than one occasion whether any of the paperwork
had been prepared. Hollows responded each time that the paperwork
had not been prepared,

Stallings also testified that sometime

later he and Kellum met to discuss raising appellant's salary.
After discussing the proposed raise with the appellant, appellant's
annual salary was increased from $40,000 per year to $48,000 per
year.
Appellant testified that one morning in late May or early June
of 1984 he received a phone call from Stallings asking him to meet
with Stallings and Kellum.

He agreed.

At the meeting appellant

testified that Stallings said that he and Kellum had decided to
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-3make the appellant a partner. Accordingly, appellant testified that
they agreed that the appellant would receive shares in the firm and
an increase in salary from $40,000 per year to $48,000 per year.
Stalling© agreed to do the necessary paperwork and appellant
assumed that he had been made a partner in the firm. According to
appellant, Hollows was not present at that meeting but was present
at another meeting between Kellum, Stallings and himself. At that
subsequent meeting the four discussed changing the name of the
firm.

Appellant testified that Kellum said he ^"as not opposed to

changing the name of the firm as long as Beaman was kept the first
name in the firm name*

Stallings did not voice any objection.

The appellant also testified that after his first meeting with
Kellum and Stallings he placed an ad in the News and observer
announcing his addition to the firm as a partner.

He did this

because he wanted it announced and he thought it would be good for
the firm/s business • He did not think he needed the approval of
Kellum and stallings because, in his view, he had already been made
a partner*

The firm paid for the ad.

No meeting was ever called

to discuss the ad and no reprimand or disciplinary measures were
taken against appellant for submitting the ad to the newspaper.
In the fall of 1984 Kellum also changed the firm's name in the
yellow pages of the local telephone book by adding the names of
Hollows and the appellant* Kellum authorized the change w[b]ecause
J he] thought the work, the paperwork would be done, and those guys
would own some shares, have their name on the door, make them work

P. 1
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-4better, feel a part of it**

The following year, Kellum had the

appellants name deleted from the listing.
In the fall of 1986 appellant began working on a rate case for
the North Carolina Department of Insurance which required him to
spend time in Raleigh, rather than at the firm offices in New Bern*
During this same period of time Stallings and Kellum became
dissatisfied with the appellant's work largely because they felt
that the appellant was devoting too much time to the rate case and
neglecting his other cases.
On 22 April 1987 the appellant tendered his resignation to
Kellum and left the firm to practice in Raleigh.

On 11 May 1987

appellant submitted a bill to the North Carolina Department of
Insurance for work he performed in the rate case between 30
December 1986 and 30 April 1987*

On 21 May 1987 the Department of

Insurance issued a check to the plaintiff
$38,646.62*

in the amount of

The appellant received the check during May. He did

not inform the firm that he had billed the Department of Insurance
or received the check.
personal account.

Rather, he deposited the check into a

Appellant testified that he retained the funds

upon advice of two separate attorneys, Jim Mills and Robert Bode,
as an offset for funds he thought the firm owed him*

In June of

1987, Kellum and Stallings found out that the Department of
Insurance had issued the check to the appellant.
In September of 1987 the appellant filed a suit against the
firm and against Kellum and Stallings individually in which he
alleged inter alia that he had been made a partner and that the

P. G
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firm owed him money .

The appellant and the firm entered into a

settlement agreement and release effective 23 March 1989 which
provided that the appellant could retain all but $12,500 of the
Department of Insurance check and that the firm would pay the
appellant $4,387.31 in full settlement of all claims the appellant
might have*
On 13 December 1989 appellant received a summons and complaint
from the DHC of the North Carolina State Bar-

After a full

hearing, the Commission made the following findings of fact which
are contested by appellant:
17 .
Prior to his departure from the
firm, Nelson never made any statements to
Hollows, Stallings or Kellum which indicated
that Nelson thought he had been made an owner
or partner in the firm,
22*
Neither Stallings nor Kellum ever
promised that Nelson's compensation was or
would be based on some portion of fees brought
into the firm* Neither stallings nor Kellum
ever promised that Nelson would be entitled to
bonuses or any additional compensation other
than his annual salary*
24.
Prior to this departure from the
firm, Nelson never made any statements to
Kellum, Hollows, Stallings or to the firm
bookkeeper which indicated that Nelson thought
he was entitled to any additional sums of
money beyond his usual salary*
35* Nelson did not have a reasonable,
good faith belief that he was a partner in the
firm or that he was entitled to additional
sums of money at the time he billed the
Department of Insurance and received and
retained the $38,646.62.check40. Defendant's Ex. B contains a list of
legal matters pending when Nelson left B, K &
S in April 1987. Defendant's Ex. Q contains a
list of fees which Nelson alleged he was due
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-6from B, K & S. Nelson did not deliver either
exhibit or any copies thereof to Kellum or
Stallings at any time prior to instituting the
civil action in September 1987.
The DHC also made findings that the appellant acted improperly
while handling personal injury cases for Ms* Margaret Slipsager and
Mr* Clarence Dewberry.

The DHC then concluded:

1* By retaining the $38,646.62 Department
of Insurance Company check when he did not
have a reasonable, good faith belief that he
had a legitimate claim to any funds from B, K
& S, Nelson engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, in violation of Rule 1.2(C).
2. By failing to file a notice of claim
or lawsuit on Ms. Slipsager's behalf in a
timely fashion, Nelson neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him in violation of Rule
6(B)(3) and DR 6*101(A)(3) and prejudiced a
client in violation of Rule 7.1(A)(3) and DR
7-101(A)(3).
3* By failing
to
respond to Ms.
Slipsager's
requests
for
information
respecting
her
case,
Nelson
failed
to
communicate adequately with a client, in
violation of Rule 6(B)(1).
4. By failing to file a notice of claim
or lawsuit on Dewberry's behalf in a timely
fashion, Nelson neglected a legal matter in
violation of Rule 6(B)(3) and DR 6-101(A)(3).
5. By falsely assuring Dewberry that a
claim had been filed on his behalf and that
negotiations
were
underway
respecting
Dewberry's claim, Nelson engaged in conduct
involving
dishonesty,
fraud,
deceit
or
misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 1.2(C)
and DR 1-102 (A) (4) and engaged in conduct
adversely reflecting
on his fitness to
practice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6)•
Accordingly, the Commission entered an Order of Discipline which
inter ftlia suspended the appellant from practicing law for nine
months.

Appellant appeals.
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Carolin Bakewell for the plaintiff-appellee.
Cheshire, Parker, Hughes £ Manning, by Joseph B. Cheshire, V.
and Alan M. Schneider for the defendant-appellant.
EAGLES, Judge.
I
Initially we note that appellant raised seventeen assignments
of

error on

appeal*

However,

appellant

failed

to

support

assignments 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 or 16 with reason,
argument or authority.
abandoned.

Accordingly, those assignments have been

N.C.R. App* Pro. 28(b)(5)*
II

Appellant argues that findings of fact numbers 17, 22, 24, 35
and 40 made by the DHC are not supported by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence drawn from the whole record.

We disagree and

affirm.
The standard of proof and the standard for judicial review for
attorney discipline cases is set out in North Carolina State Bar v.
Whitted, 82 N.C. App. 531, 347 S.E*2d 60 (1986), affirmed, 319 N.C.
398, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987).

The standard of proof in attorney discipline
and disbarment proceedings is one of "clear,
cogent and convincing11 evidence* Rules of the
North Carolina State Bar, Art IX, Sec. 14(18)*
See In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 647-48, 252
S*E*2d784, 789-90 (1979) (adopting standard) ;
N.C. State Bar v* Sheffield, 73 N.C. App. 349,
354, 326 S.E*2d 320, 323, cert, denied, 314
N.C. 117, 332 S«E*2d 482, cert, denied,
U*S*
, 88 L.Ed.2d 338, 106 S*Ct. 385
(1985).
"Clear, cogent and convincing
describes an evidentiary standard stricter
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than the preponderance of the evidence, but
less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.. . • It has been defined as 'evidence
which should fully convince. '"
Sheffieldr
supj-g (citations omitted).
The standard for judicial review of
attorney discipline cases is the "whole
record" test. N . C State Bar v. DuMont, 304
N.C. 627, 642, 286 S,E«2d 89, 98 (1982).
"Under the whole record test there must be
substantial evidence to support the findings,
conclusions and result.*.. The evidence is
substantial if, when considered as a whole, it
is such that a reasonable person might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at
643, 286 S.E.2d at 98-99.
*

* *

"The 'whole record' test does not allow the
reviewing court to replace the [Committee's]
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting
views, even though the court could justifiably
have reached a different result had the matter
been before it de novo." Thompson v. Board of
Education, 292 N.C* 406, 410 233 S.E.2d 538,
541 (1977).
Whitted. 82VN.C. App. at 536, 347 S.E.2d at 63 (1986).
On appeal the appellant, both in his brief and during oral
argument, highlighted

evidence

in the record which tends to

establish facts contra to those found by the DHC

However, this

Court's task is not to replace the DHCs judgment with our own.
Id.

Rather, our task is to determine whether after applying the

whole record test, the DHCs findings are properly supported by the
record even though we might have reached a different result had the
matter been before us de novo.

We hold that the record before us

contains substantial evidence to support the contested findings of
fact.

Accordingly, we find no error.
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Appellant also argues that the DHC lacked authority to
determine whether the firm was a partnership or a professional
association. We are not required to address this question*

If the

firm was a partnership, the DHC found that the appellant had no
reasonable good faith belief that he was a partner.

If the firm

was a professional association, the DHC found that neither Kellum
nor Stallings ever promised the appellant that his compensation
would be based on a portion of the fees he brought into the firm,
nor did they ever promise him a bonus or additional compensation
above

his

annual

salary*

Under

either

interpretation

the

appellant, according to the DHC's findings, could not have had a
reasonable good faith belief that he was entitled to additional
sums over his salary.

This argument is overruled,
III

Appellant next argues that the DHC wrongfully concluded that
appellant

acted

dishonestly

by

retaining

the

Department

of

Insurance check without a reasonable good faith belief that he had
a legitimate claim to any of the funds. We disagree.
Appellant first argues that he acted pursuant to a good faith
belief that he was entitled to additional sums from the firm when
he retained the Department of Insurance check.

This argument is

essentially a restatement of the argument addressed under heading
II supra and we disagree for the reasons stated there*
Appellant next argues that he acted reasonably because he
acted in conformity with the advice of counsel•
made the following findings of fact:

However, the DHC

On 11 May 1987 appellant
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-10billed the Department of Insurance, which issued a check to the
appellant on 21 May 1987. Appellant did not inform the firm that
he had billed the Department of Insurance or that he had received
the check-

The DHC also found that the appellant first sought the

advice of legal counsel, James Mills, in late June or early July,
and that appellant did not seek the counsel of Bob Bode until
September 1987. We note that the back of the check indicates that
the appellant negotiated the check on 21 May 1987. DHC's findings
are sufficient to support the conclusion that the appellant was not
acting upon the advice of counsel when he retained and deposited
the Department of Insurance check into his personal account.
Accordingly, this argument fails.
IV
In his final assignment, appellant argues that the DHC abused
its discretion by suspending the appellant from the practice of law
for nine months*

Me disagree.

Appellant contends that "neither the North Carolina State Bar
nor the Disciplinary Hearing Commission were the proper parties to
bring or hear this case under the authority granted it in Chapter
84 of the General Statutes of North Carolina and the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar."
appellant,

According to the

"[tjhere is no rule in the Code of Professional

Responsibility or the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct
that governs accounting procedures for law firm funds and under no
circumstances should the state Bar have involved itself in an
intra-partnership accounting dispute*" In support of its argument
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appellant cites Matter of Rice, 99 Wash. 2d 275, 661 P.2d 591
(1983). During oral argument, however, the appellant conceded that
whenever there is a question of dishonesty, beyond the rudimentary
need for an accounting to resolve internal law firm disputes, the
DHC has jurisdiction to hear matters involving internal law firm
disputes. Here, the DHC specifically concluded that the appellant
engaged

in dishonest conduct toy retaining the Department of

Insurance check without a reasonable good faith belief that he was
entitled to any funds from the firm.

This assignment is without

merit.
Finally/ appellant argues that the DHC abused its discretion
by suspending him from the practice of law for nine months . "The
discipline imposed was within the statutory limits.
Stat, 84-28 (b), (c).

N,C. Gen.

This Court [has] stated that 'so long as the

punishment imposed is within the limits allowed by the statute this
Court does ' not have the authority to modify or change it.'11
Whjitted, 82 N«C. App. at 539-40, 347 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting N.C.
State Bar V. Wilson, 74 N.C. App. 777, 784, 330 S,E.2d 280, 284
(1985)•

This assignment is likewise without merit and therefore

overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges JOHNSON and PARKER concur.
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APPENDIX N

Wendell K. Smith, #3019
Assistant Bar Counsel
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-9110
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
Hearing Panel:
Harold L. Petersen, Chair
Barbara K. Polich

In the Matter of the
Complaint by
AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT J. DALE

BAR COUNSEL
against

F-520
WILLIAM R. SHUPE
DOB: 08-20-54
ADM: 10-15-84
STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I, Robert J. Dale, being first duly sworn, affirm and
state that:
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law in
the State of Utah, a member of the law firm of McMurray,
McMurray, Dale, & Parkinson, and counsel to Bryant D. Cragun
2. On or about October 14, 1992, William R. Shupe
paid to Mr. Cragun the sum of $7,000.00 by delivering a
check in that amount, payable to Mr. Cragun, to the law firm
of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson. This was a refund
of part of the $25,000.00 he was holding in trust for Mr.
Cragun.
3. Mr. Shupe informed me that he would refund to
Mr. Cragun the additional amount of $13,000.00, by
delivering the funds to the law firm of McMurray, McMurray,
Dale & Parkinson, not later than December 31, 1992• As of
the date of the signing of this Affidavit Mr. Shupe has not
delivered to this law firm the additional $13,000.00.

4. I have verified that Respondent has not made
this payment directly to Mr. Cragun.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT,

DATED this

^

Aj ^ " day of:J\ &YUMW/^ , 1993.

Subscribed and sworn before me this \ ^ J ^
'
, 1993
My C o m m i s s i o n

Expires:

MySmf^rionlxpir8« I
October 11.1993
Stateof&ah

I
J

2

day of
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Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARFCINSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR:
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF I

BRYANT D. CRAGUN,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs .
WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually,
RICHARD YAGI, individually,
and JOHN DOES I - V,

Civil No.
Judge

<tcic?a^7t

dH

(Jury Demanded)
Defendants.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Bryant D. Cragun, by and through
his attorneys of record, and alleges as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff

is

an

individual

residing

in

Davis

County and doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant William R. Shupe

(hereinafter "Shupe")

is an individual residing, doing business, and practicing law as
a licensed attorney, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendant Richard Yagi (hereinafter "Yagi") is an

individual residing in and doing business in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
4.

Defendants John Does I - V are all individuals or

entities presently unknown
belief, participated

to Plaintiff who, on information and

in or otherwise

and- omissions hereinafter alleged.

facilitated

the misconduct

Plaintiff will amend his Com-

plaint to include the actual names of Defendants John Does I - V
when

the

facts

and

the

true

names

of

such

parties

are

ascer-

1988, and prior

to and

tained .
5.
during

During

January,

possibility
interest

of

in

the latter part of

1989,

Yagi

Plaintiff

a

publicly

and

Plaintiff

purchasing
held

from

discussed

Yagi

corporation

a

the

controlling

(hereinafter

the

purchase

the

"Corporation").
6.
controlling
request,

During
interest

deposited

negotiations
in

the

the

for

Corporation

amount

of

the

Plaintiff,

Twenty-Five

of

at

Thousand

Yagi's
Dollars

($25,000.00) (the "Funds") in the trust account(s) of Shupe to be
held by Shupe as escrow agent

for Plaintiff's potential purchase

of the stock of the Corporation and to be used and delivered to
Yagi

only

in the

event

such purchase

Yagi and Plaintiff agreed that

was -actually

consummated.

the Funds would not be disbursed

to Yagi and would be returned to Plaintiff in the event Plaintiff
did not purchase the controlling interest in the Corporation from
Yagi.
7.

The Funds were deposited into the trust account(s)

of Shupe by checks issued in the following amounts:
A.

Check

No.

1021,

- 2 -

dated

January

19,

1989,

in

the amount of $5,000.00;
B.

Check No. 491, dated January 30, 1989, in the

amount of $5,000.00;
C.

Check

No.

1124, dated

February

2,

1989,

in

the amount of $12,000.00; and
D.

Check No. 1125, dated

February

14, 1989, in

the amount of $3,000.00, for a total deposit of $25,000.00.

True

and correct copies of said checks are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibits "A" through "D" , respectively.
8.

In receiving Plaintiff's Funds, Shupe was informed

that the Funds deposited into Defendant Shupe 1 s trust account(s)
were Plaintiff's

Funds and were to be used

for the express

and

sole purpose of paying for stock of the Corporation in the event
Plaintiff purchased the controlling interest in the Corporation.
9.

On information and belief, the Funds were in fact

deposited in the trust account(s) of Shupe.

Shupe was

therefore

serving in a fiduciary capacity and owed the highest duty of care
and

fair dealing

primarily
proper

to Plaintiff.

responsible

disbursement

As such, Shupe was directly

for the safe-keeping,

of

the

Funds

deposited

and

proper receipt, and
into

his

trust

ac-

count (s) .
10.

Shupe was personally responsible for the Funds and

was not authorized to use or disburse to Yagi any portion of the
Funds

unless

Corporation's
was

ever

and until
stock

such

time

as:

(a) The

to Plaintiff was made,

consummated;

and

(b) express

- 3 -

if

transfer
that

approval

of

the

transaction

was

given

to

Shupe by Plaintiff to disburse the Funds to Yagi (the contents of
subparagraphs

"a" and

"b" of

this

paragraph

are

hereinafter

collectively referred to as the "Corporate Purchase").
11.

The

Corporate

Purchase

was

never

completed

and

never occurred, and Plaintiff, individually and through counsel,
therefore requested and demanded that Shupe return the Funds to
Plaintiff.
12.

Despite

Plaintiff's

repeated

demands

for

the

return of the Funds, and Shupefs subsequent repeated promises to
return the same, Shupe has only returned the amount of 56,000.00
to Plaintiff.
13.

Based upon information and belief, the balance of

the Funds (519,000.00) were wrongfully delivered by Shupe to Yagi
and/or otherwise diverted, comingled, misapplied, and/or improperly disbursed (hereinafter separately and collectively referred
to as the "Misappropriations)"/"Misappropriated").
14.

On information and belief, the Misappropriation of

the Funds was a conspiratorial act of both Defendants Shupe and
Yagi, and done at the expense of Plaintiff for Defendants' mutual
benefit.
15.

The circumstances surrounding the deposit of Funds

by Plaintiff with Shupe and the Misappropriation of the Funds
were more than sufficient to put Shupe on reasonable notice to
make

inquiry

into

and

to

prevent

and/or

cure

the Misappro-

priation, even if the Misappropriation was not done knowingly.
16.
diligence

Shupe, through the use and exercise of reasonable

on his

part,

could

and

should

have

prevented

and

remedied any improper disbursement to Yagi or any other Misappropriation.
17.

Yagi

and

Shupe were

agents

of each other with

respect to the receipt, deposit, and disbursement of Plaintiff's
Funds , and
liability

as
of

such
the

are

each

other

charged

regarding

with

the

the

receipt,

knowledge

and

deposit,

and

disbursement of Plaintiff's Funds.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)
18.

Plaintiff

hereby

incorporates

into

and makes

a

part of his First Cause of Action each and every other paragraph
In this Complaint.
19.

The escrowed Funds wrongfully Misappropriated by

Defendants were the property of Plaintiff.
20.

Defendants, and each of them, knexv or reasonably

should have known that the Funds being wrongfully Misappropriated
were Funds belonging to the Plaintiff and could not be legally
used by the Defendants.
21.

Defendants,

and

each

of

them,

further

knew

or

reasonably should have known that the Funds were being wrongfully
Misappropriated.
22.

Through

their conduct

and

omissions, as alleged

herein, including the Misappropriation of the Funds, Defendants
have

converted

directly

to

their

or indirectly,

own

use

such Funds

amount of not less than $19,000.00.

- 5 -

and
in

for

their

own benefit,

the remaining

principal

23.
Defendants,
principal

Plaintiff

and

each

amount

is

of

entitled

to

them,

jointly

less

than

of not

judgment
and

against

severally,

$19,000.00,

in

together

the
the
with

interest thereon at the rate of not less than ten percent (101)
per annum from the time of the Misappropriation until judgment,
and with post-judgment interest on the whole thereof until paid
at the rate of twelve percent (12Z) per annum.
24.

Plaintiff further is entitled to judgment against

Defendants, jointly and severally, for any and all consequential
damages

proximately

caused

by

Defendants'

misconduct

and

omissions, as alleged herein, as a result of the Misappropriation
and in otherwise intentionally
dants'

own

use,

directly

or

converting such Funds to Defenindirectly,

including,

without

limitation, for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs and lost
opportunities to be shown at trial.
25.

Defendants' conversion was willful, intentional,

and/or was undertaken
rights

of

Plaintiff,

in clear
and

and reckless

was

performed

disregard
with

an

of the
express

appreciation of the damages and losses that would likely result
from the conversion, including damages and losses to Plaintiff.
26.

Defendants converted the Funds because, in part,

they believed that liability for their tortious conduct would be
limited to a return of the Funds.

Unless punished by the Court

herein, Defendants are likely to repeat this or similar conduct
in the future.

Defendants1 actions justify an award of exemplary

and punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount of not less than
$100,000.00, to deter further instances of lawless behavior by
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Defendants.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breaches of Fiduciary Duties)
27.

Plaintiff incorporates

into and makes a part of

his Second Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in
this Complaint.
28.

Shupe, as a licensed attorney and in his capacity

as escrow-holder of the Funds, owed the highest fiduciary duties
and obligations to Plaintiff, and a high standard of care towards
Plaintiff, to safeguard and properly apply the Plaintiff's Funds
and,

further,

to not make

disbursement

of

the

Funds

without

Plaintiff's approval and not to make any Misappropriation of the
Funds.
29.

Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in Shupe to

properly safeguard and apply the Funds, and thereupon there arose
a

relationship

of

trust

and

confidence

between

Plaintiff

and

attorney

and

Shupe.
30.
escrow-holder

In

his

position

of Plaintiff's

and

capacity

Funds, Shupe,- by

as

Misappropriating

the Funds, has breached his fiduciary duties and obligations, and
his high standard of care, owed to Plaintiff.
31.

As a direct result of Defendant ShupeTs aforesaid

violations and breaches of his fiduciary duties, Plaintiff has
suffered damages in the principal amount of at least $19,000.00,
and will continue to suffer damages as a result of Defendants1
Misappropriation of the Funds.

32.

Plaintiff

is entitled

to punitive

and exemplary

damages for and based upon Defendant Shupe's aforesaid violations
and breaches of his fiduciary duties in an amount not less than
$100,000.00.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breaches of Express Contract)
33.

Plaintiff

incorporates

into and makes a part of

his Third Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in this
Complaint.
34.

Defendants have breached

their express

agreement

with Plaintiff regarding the deposit, holding, disbursement, and
safeguarding of the Funds, by Misappropriating the Funds prior to
any completion of the Corporate Purchase.
35.
Plaintiff

has

As

a

direct

suffered

result

damages

in

of

Defendants'

the

principal

breaches,
amount

of

$19,000.00 plus legal interest.
36.

As a further direct and proximate cause of Defen-

dants' breach, Plaintiff has suffered consequential damages and
lost opportunities in an amount to be proven at trial, including
Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breaches of Implied Contract and
Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
37.

Plaintiff incorporates

into and makes a part of

his Fourth Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in

- 8 -

this Complaint.
38.
breached

By

their

Misappropriating
implied

contract

the

Funds,

with

Defendants

Plaintiff

to

have

properly

receive, hold, safeguard, and disburse Plaintiff's Funds and not
to Misappropriate Plaintiff's Funds.
39.

By Misappropriating Plaintiff's Funds, Defendants

further have breached their implied and express duties of good
faith and fair dealing with Plaintiff to properly receive, hold,
safeguard, and disburse Plaintiff's Funds.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence, Gross Negligence, and Recklessness)
40.

Plaintiff

incorporates

into and makes a part of

his Fifth Cause of Action each and every other paragraph in this
Complaint.
41.

Defendants owed certain duties of care to Plain-

tiff with respect to the Funds including properly and diligently
safeguarding and applying the Funds.
42.
Plaintiff

to

Defendants further owed duties and obligations to
exercise

reasonable

care,

skill, and

diligence,

under the circumstances, with respect to the Funds.
43.

Due

to Defendant

Shupe's unique

position

as an

attorney, and specifically as the attorney for Yagi, Shupe was
intimately

familiar

with

the

proposed

business

transactions

between Plaintiff and Yagi and therefore had a high duty to not
cause or permit any Misappropriation or improper disbursement of
the Funds.
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44.

Inspite

of

the

information

Defendants

had

or

should have known, and notwithstanding the information available
to

Defendants,

negligent,

Defendants

and/or

safeguard,

acted

reckless

segregate,

in

manner

and

apply

a

m

negligent,
failing

the

to

Funds,

grossly
properly
and

m

Misappropriating the Funds.
45

Defendants breached

their duties and obligations

owed to Plaintiff with respect to the Funds by negligently, gross
negligently

and/or

acquiescing

m,

recklessly

and/or

accomplishing, participating ±.n,

ratifying

the Misappropriation

of

the

I-unds
46

As

a direct

and

proximate

cause of Defendants1

negligence, gross negligence and/or recklessness, Plaintiff has
beer damaged m

the principal amount of $19,000 00, plus accruing

interest and other consequential damages to be shown at trial,
including Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Misrepresentation)
47

Plaintiff

hereby

incorporates

into

and makes

a

part of his Sixth Cause of Action each and every other paragraph
m

this Complaint.
48.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants

had a pecuniary interest m
otherwise m
49.

promoting the Corporate Purchase and

receiving the Funds from Plaintiff.
Defendants actually and impliedly, and carelessly,

negligently, grossly negligently, and recklessly represented to

Plaintiff that one or all of the following was true:
A.

That Plaintiff's Funds would be kept safe and

returned to Plaintiff in the event the Corporate Purchase was not
consummated;
B.
50.

That the Funds would not be Misappropriated.

The representations

made by the Defendants were

material and false when they were made.
51.

Defendants expected Plaintiff to rely and act upon

the false representations.
52.

Plaintiff

reasonably

relied

upon

the

false,

material representations of Defendants to his injury and damage.
53.

Plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of the false

representations of the Defendants in the amount of $19,000.00,
representing the amount of Funds not returned to Plaintiff when
the Corporate Purchase was not consummated, and such consequential damages as shall be shown at the trial hereof, including
Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unjust Enrichment)
54.

Plaintiff incorporates

into and makes a part of

his Seventh Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in
this Complaint.
55.

By

their Misappropriation

of

the

Funds, Defen-

dants, and each of them, have been unjustly enriched at Plaintiff's

expense, in an

amount

not

less

than

accrued interest and consequential damages.
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$19,000.00, plus

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:
1.

For general damages in the sum of $19,000.00.

2.

For special damages due to lost opportunities and

other consequential damages, including without limitation attorneys' fees and costs, in a sum to be determined by the Court.
3.

For

pre-judgment

interest

at

the

rate

of

ten

percent (10Z) per annum from January 19, 1989, through the date
of judgment.
4.

For post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve

percent (121) per annum.
5.

For

Plaintiff's

costs

of

suit

herein

incurred,

including collection expenses and attorneys' fees.
6.

For punitive damages in an amount not less than

$100,000.00.
7.

For such other and further relief as the Court may

deem proper.
DATED this

j J~-

/

ciay of June, 1989.
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE
& PARKINSON, P.C.

tfob^rt/C^. Dale
TatfD. Draper
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-:R ~
v
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
' __
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311
" •. : j-, r "'.
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt-Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

BRYANT D. CRAGUN,

:
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

Plaintiff,

:

vs .
Civil No. 89 C 779A

WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually,
RANDY YAGI, incivicuaily, and
:
JOHN DOES I - X,

Judge Aldon J. Anderson

Defendants.

I IN TrilS ACTION, the Defendant, William R. Shupe, having
been

regularl\

and

answer

served

the

with

Complaint

process
filed

answering having expired, and
in

the

upon

premises having been

the

written

and having
herein,

the

failed
legal

the Default of the said
duly

application

of

entered
the

according

Plaintiff

to

to appear
time

for

Defendant

to law, now
the

above

entitled court and oral argument and presentation of evidence on
February 1, 1990, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and enters Judgment as set forth herein:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant William R. Shupe has been duly

served

with process and the Default of the said Defendant has been duly
entered according to law.
2.

-The

Court

finds

that

the

factual

allegations

alleged, by the Plaintiff against Defendant William R
correct

and

court's

file

true based
as well

upon

as

the written

the Affidavit

Shupe, are

documentation

m

the

of Bryan D. Cragun of

December 23, 1989.
3.
Plaintiff's

The Court further finds that the material facts of
Complaint

justify

a

Default

Judgment

ana

award

against Defendant Shupe as supported by the representations of
counsel that Plaintiff has not received payment or reimbursement
for funds invested m

a stock offering proposed and presented by

Defendant Shupe.
A.

The

Court

specifically

finds

the

elements

of

common law fraud and securities violations to be amply supported
and justified, with the exception of Section 17 of the Federal
Act
5.

The

Court

specifically

finds

that

Plaintiff

initially invested the sum of $15,000.00 m

this stock purchase

transaction

for

and

that

the

costs

of

cover

a

subsequently

attempted sale of Plaintiff's stock leave Plaintiff with an out
of pocket expenditure and loss of $187,500.00.
6-

The Court further finds the specific application

of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 and finds a violation of said statute,

- 2 -

resulting

in

trebling

of

Plaintiff's

initial

$15,000.00

inves tment.
7.
out-of-pocket

Accordingly,
expenditure

$30,000.00 .awarded

so

as

the
of

amount

of

Plaintiff,

to

treble

the

$187,500.00
and

amount

an
of

as

an

additional
Plaintiffs

initial investment is just and proper.
8.

The Court further finds that attorneys' fees and

costs incurred in bringing this action in the amount of $A,395.40
is just and proper.
9.

The Court then considered

the issue of punitive

damages and finds that an award of punitive damages is supported
by the evidence, pleadings and affidavits and documents contained
in the file.
10.

Plaintiff1s

counsel

requested

a

$100,000.00

punitive award but this figure was rejected inasmuch as there was
a lack of sufficient financial information on Defendant William
R.

Shupe

egregious

to justify
nature

liabilities,

an

this amount.

of Defendant
award

of

Accordingly, based upon the

Shupe 1 s

$25,000.00

actions, activities
in

punitive

damages

and
is

proper.
11.

The Court further finds that it is just and proper

to augment the amount of attorneys' fees and costs which will be
expended in enforcing this Judgment and retains jurisdiction for
the purpose of augmenting any additional expended amounts as part
of this original Judgment.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reasons of the
premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
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that except for the claim under Section 17 of the Federal Act,
Plaintiff

is hereby

awarded Judgment against Defendant William

Shupe on his Complaint as follows:
1.

Actual

and

consequential

damages

for

the

replacement value of the stock in the amount of $187,500.00 (said
amount including the initial investment of $15,000.00);
2.

An

additional

$30,000.00

so

as

to

treble

the

initial investment amount pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 61-1-22;
3.

For attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing

this action in the amount of $4,395.40;
4.

For punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00;

5.

For interest on ail amounts awarded at the rate of

121 per annum from the date of this Judgment until collected;
6.

It is further ordered that this Court shall retain

jurisdiction in this matter in order to augment this Judgment to
cover amount of reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended in
enforcing

this Judgment; any request

for augmentation shall be

established by Affidavit filed before this Court by Plaintiff or
his counsel.
DATED this

^
?—

day of Fjeirtruary; 1990'.
BY THE COURT:
/ //

on J„ Andeerson
Judge Aldon

Ccagxil
tad21

.
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-

MAR ] 7 ] 9 9 3
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125

OFFICE OF RAQ cm .MSFi

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
BRYANT D. CRAGUN,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually,
RICHARD YAGI, individually, and
JOHN DOES I - X,

Civil No. 890903670CV
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
notice is hereby given of the signing and entry of a Default
Judgment against Defendants
DATED this

I

3r-k day of February, 1990.
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE
& PARKINSON

A.
^•U/Ml
£'
^
V?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
this

/4"&- day of February, 1990 to:
Richard B. Yagi
875 Donner Way,
Salt Lake City, UT

84108

William R. Shupe
7050 South Union Park Blvd., #545
Midvale, Utah 84047

Jk-T - </ Sf£~
c -,l jy

APPENDIX P

Wendell K. Smith, #3019
Office of Bar Counsel
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In The Matter of the
Complaint by
BAR COUNSEL

DEFAULT

against

F-520

WILLIAM R. SHUPE
DOB: 08-20-54
ADM: 10-15-84

The Respondent having been regularly served with
process, and having failed to appear and answer the Formal
Complaint on file in the above-captioned matter, and the
time allowed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar and the Summons for answering having expired, the
default of the Respondent is hereby entered, upon the
request of the Office of Bar Counsel.
DATED this

^

day of fl/kUJA

, 1992.

John C. Baldwin
Executive Director

CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Default in the matter of Bar Counsel against
William Shupe, F-520, was mailed certified mail, postal
certification number

/

-^

' T?J / , return receipt

requested to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic Center Dr. West,
Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this ^r£7?day of

1992.

/

/? <1 L vf^_

r

Wendell K. Smith, #3019
Office of Bar Counsel
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In The Matter of the
Complaint by

]
]

BAR COUNSEL

]I
|

against

]I

F-520

'

WILLIAM R. SHUPE
DOB: 08-20-54
ADM: 10-15-84
TO:

REQUEST FOR ENTRY
OF DEFAULT

]

John C. Baldwin
Executive Director

The Respondent having been regularly served with
process, and having failed to appear and answer the Formal
Complaint on file in the above-captioned matter, and the
time allowed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar and the Summons for answering having expired, the
Office of Bar Counsel hereby requests that you enter the
default of the Respondent•
DATED this

P^^day of

/*7S<t/?

, 1992.

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

By: ^ f ^ / C ^ T
/Wendell K. Smith
Assistant Bar Counsel

Wendell K. Smith, #3019
Office of Bar Counsel
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In The Matter of the
Complaint by
BAR COUNSEL

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFAULT

against

F-520

WILLIAM R. SHUPE
DOB: 08-20-54
ADM: 10-15-84

To:

William R. Shupe, Respondent
333 Civic Center Dr. West
Santa Ana, CA 92701
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That an Answer to the Sximmons and

Formal Complaint not having been filed within the time fixed
by the Summons, the Commission through the Executive
Director, shall enter your default if saxd answer is not
filed within five (5) days of the date hereof.

DATED this JJ^fllay

of ftfjfv/tsy,

1992.

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

^6ndell K. Smith
Assistant Bar Counsel

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Intent To Default in the matter of Bar
Counsel against William Shupe, F-520, was mailed certified
mail, postal certification number

^J ^f?Cf <5c/6 'KJ6 7

,

return receipt requested to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic
Center Dr. West, Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this /,^'^day of
tt-K^v,

, 1992.

/ 'f>k?tc 'LCi~

or

• s - - «s • • • •.COI

P S7T 3M5 3 b 7
Certified Mail Receipt
-^

" No Insurance Coverage Provided
Do not use for Internationa! Mail
See

X£2gS& (

Reverse)

o j? -£-a ^ « o ® ® "fTI

9-TJ O # _ J < *»• 6> -* A

Sent to

W i l l i a m R . S h u p e , Esc
S*-^et & No.

333 C i v i c C e n t e r Dr

:iY3£fc.£jk3

P.O., State & ZIP Code

S a n t a Ana, UT 92701
Postage

$

Certified Fee
Special Delivery Fee
Restricted Delivery Fee
Return Receipt Snowing
to Whom & Date Delivered
Return Receipt Showing to Whom,
P<*te, & Address of Delivery
TOTAL Postage
AFees

$

Postmark or Date

2/12/92

•«2«56?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Request for Entry of Default in the matter of Bar
Counsel against William Shupe, F-520, was mailed postage
pre-paid to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic Center Dr. West,
Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this, ^ ^ d a y of
1992.

s /¥ ~~-

/'/

u c

A-

,
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APPENDIX R

The Office of Bar Counsel has not been provided a copy of this
appendix. A copy has been requested from the Clerk of the Court
but has not yet been made available. Upon receipt of the
documents referenced in this appendix they will be forwarded to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court and to the Respondent for
inclusion.
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STATE EX REL STATE BAR v VEITH

Neb

549

Cite as 470 N W.2d 549 (Neb 1991)

every one of two or more persons or
things composing the whole, separately
considered
Black's Law Dictionary 455 (5th ed 1979)
(emphasis added) The term "each," in the
1980 agreement, plainly refers to the sepa
rate lifetimes of George and Phyllis The
wills do not contradict this interpretation of
their agreement
George breached the
1980 agreement when he added codicils to
his 1980 will during Phyllis' lifetime, and
also when he changed his will after Phyllis'
death
IV
[9] This type of action is not based on
wills but upon an agreement' of which the
Will is but evidence " Mosloski v Gamble,
191 Minn 170, 174, 253 N W 378, 381
(1934) Here, the competing policies are
the enforceability of the contract and
George's right to bequeath property as he
desired George could change his will, but
the contract may be enforced in equity if it
is valid and enforcement is necessary for

the prevention of fraud
253 N W at 381

DECISION

See td at "17$
j>(3
Ml

J

We reverse the trial court and hold that
appellants have standing as intended bene!
ficianes of the 1980 Agreement to bring
this action The 1980 agreement is a valid
contract supported by sufficient consideration where George and Phyllis made mutu;
al promises not to revoke or change thenwills George breached the 1980 agree-'
ment when he changed his will We remand to the trial court* to address the
breach of contract claim and to fashion any
appropriate relief
Reversed and remanded

238 Neb 239
j ^ 9 S T A T E of Nebraska ex rel
NEBRASKA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, Relator,

Douglas VEITH, Respondent
No 90-461
Supreme Court of Nebraska
May 31 1991

Attorney disciplinary proceeding was
brought The Supreme Court held that
commingling of trust funds with law office
funds and willful appropriation warrant
disbarment
Disbarment ordered

1 Attorney and Client <s=»57
A proceeding to discipline an attorney
is a trial de novo on record in which Su
preme Court reaches conclusion indepen
dent of findings of referee provided where
credible evidence is in conflict on material
issue of fact, Supreme Court considers and
may give weight to fact that referee heard
and observed witnesses and accepted one
version of facts rather than another
2 Attorney and Client «=»53(2)
Supreme Court, in its de novo review
of record must find that particular com
plaint has been established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to sustain it
against an attorney in a disciplinary pro
ceeding
3 Attorney and Client c=>38 44(1)
An attorney s violation of a discipli
nary rule and failure to act competently by
neglecting a matter entrusted to him or her
is conduct violative of an attorney s oath as
member of bar
Neb Rev St § 7-104
Code of Prof Resp DR 1-102 DR 9-102
4 Attorney and Client <s=>44(2)
In attorney discipline proceedings
"conversion" refers to an attorney s misap
propnation of a client s property to the

attorney s own use or some other improper
use
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
5 Attorney and Client <£=*44(2)
In attorney discipline proceedings
misappropriation is any unauthorized use
pf client s funds entrusted to a lawyer
including not only stealing but also unau
thonzed temporary use for lawyer s own
purpose whether or not he or she derives
any personal gain or benefit therefrom
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions

6 Attorney and Client 0=14(2)
An attorney s failure to use entrusted
funds for purpose for which they were
entrusted constitutes
misappropriation
for disciplinary purposes
7 Attorney and Client C=>44(2)
For purposes of attorney discipline
misappropriation caused by serious mex
cusable violation of duty to oversee en
trusted funds is deemed willful even in
absence of deliberate wrongdoing
8 Attorney and Client c=44(2)
Mere fact that an attorney s trust ac
count balance falls below the amount de
posited in and purportedly held in trust
supports finding of misappropriation
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp
DR 1-102 DR 9-102
9 Attorney and Client 0 4 4 ( 2 )
For purposes of attorney discipline an
act of conversion is complete when the
clients trust account is overdrawn or
when, through mismanagement or miscon
duct on part of attorney balance of ac
count is less than client s interest in it
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp
DR 1-102 DR 9-102
10 Attorney and Client 0 4 4 ( 2 )
An attorney s intent to defraud or lack
thereof is irrelevant when drawing checks
on clients trust account to pay personal
expenses Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of
Prof Resp DR 1-102 DR 9-102

550
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11 Attorney and Client <£=>44(2)
An attorney has a duty to keep sepa
rate and properly account for client trust
funds entrusted to him or her and promptly
pay over and deliver such funds to the
client upon request Neb Rev St § 7-104,
Code of Prof Resp, DR 1-102, DR 9-102
12 Attorney and Client <s=>44(2)
An attorney may not use client trust
funds to cover business expenses Neb
Rev St § 7-104, Code of Prof Resp , DR
1-102 DR 9-102
13 Attorney and Client «=>58
To determine whether and to what ex
tent attorney discipline should be imposed
it is necessary to consider the following
factors nature of offense need for deter
ring others maintenance of reputation of
bar as a whole, protection of public, atti
tude of offender generally, and offender's
present or future fitness to continue prac
tice of law
14 Attorney and Client e=»58
Misappropriation of client funds, as
one of the most serious violations of duty
an attorney owes to client public, and
courts typically warrants disbarment
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp ,
DR 1-102 DR 9-102
15 Attorney and Client c=44(2)
Receiving clients' funds and converting
them to personal use by placing them in an
office account without consent of client is
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp
DR 1-102 DR 9-102

dents of neglect and therefore justify morj
serious sanctions
19 Attorney and Client <^=>58
If misappropriation occurs through ar
attorneys laxity rather than a wrongfu
intent, and if this lack of intent is rein
forced by attorney's having taken remedia
action immediately updn discovery of prol>
lem, less discipline than disbarment may be
appropriate Neb Rev St § 7-104, Code di
Prof Resp DR 1-102, DR 9-102
20 Attorney and Client <3=>58
Fact that no client suffered any f n W
cial loss is no excuse for ^ lawyer to mtsaj>
propnate clients' funds nor any reason why
lawyer should not receive severe sanction,
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of ProfRespf(
DR 1-102 DR 9-102
21 Attorney and Client <s=58
To determine what sanction is appropriate, each case justifying discipline of an
attorney must be evaluated individually in
light of particular facts and circumstances
Neb Rev St §7-104, Code of Prof Resp?
DR 1-102 DR 9-102
22 Attorney and Client G=>58
w
Commingling of trust funds with law'
office funds and willful appropriation war
rant disbarment despite mitigation of prior
good standing and freedom from disciph
nary complaint, manifestations of regret,
counseling community reputation coopera
tion and pro bono work

16 Attorney and Client <£=58
Mitigating circumstances shown in
record should be considered in determining
appropriate discipline imposed on attorney
violating Code of Professional Responsibih
ty Neb Rev St § 7-104, Code of Prof
Resp DR 1-102, DR 9-102
17 Attorney and Client <S=>53(1)
Intent of attorney to misappropriate
client funds may be inferred from circum
stantial evidence

Syllabus by the Court
1 Disciplinary Proceedings Appeal
and Error A proceeding to discipline an
attorney is a trial de novo on the record, in*
which the Supreme Court reaches a conclu
sion independent of the findings of the
referee, provided where credible evidence
is m conflict on a material issue of fact, the
Supreme Court considers and may give
weight to the fact that the referee heard
and observed the witnesses and accepted
one version of the facts rather than anoth
er
i

18 Attorney and Client <s=»58
Cumulative acts of attorney miscon
duct are distinguishable from isolated inci

2 Disciplinary Proceedings Proof
Appeal and Error The Supreme Court, in
its de novo review of the record must find
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that the particular complaint has been es
tabhshed by clear and convincing evidence
m order to sustain it against an attorney in
a disciplinary proceeding
3 Disciplinary Proceedings Every
attorney admitted to practice law in Ne
braska shall take and subscribe an oath
swearing to support the Nebraska and U S
Constitutions and to faithfully discharge
the duties of an attorney and counselor to
the best of his or her abilities An attor
ney's violation of a disciplinary rule and
failure to act competently by neglecting a
matter entrusted to him or her is conduct
violative of an attorney's oath as a member
of the bar The oath requires lawyers to
observe the established codes of profes
sional ethics
4 Disciplinary Proceedings Con
version Words and Phrases In attorney
^discipline proceedings conversion refers
to an attorney's misappropriation of a
client's property to the attorney s own use
or some other improper use
5 Disciplinary Proceedings Words
and Phrases Misappropriation is any un
authorized use of clients funds entrusted
to a lawyer including not only stealing but
also unauthorized temporary use for the
lawyer's own purpose whether or not he
derives any personal gain or benefit there
from
6 Disciplinary Proceedings Intent
Words and Phrases An attorney s failure
to use entrusted funds for the purpose for
which they were entrusted constitutes mis
appropriation Misappropriation caused by
serious, inexcusable violation of a duty to
oversee entrusted funds is deemed willful
even in the absence of a deliberate wrong
doing
7 Disciplinary Proceedings Proof
The mere fact that an attorney s trust ac
count balance falls below the amount de
posited in and purportedly held in trust
supports a finding of misappropriation
8 Disciplinary Proceedings Con
version An act of conversion is complete
when the clients trust account is over
drawn or when through mismanagement
or misconduct on the part of the attorney

the balance of the account is less than the
clients interest in it
9 Disciplinary Proceedings Fraud
Intent An attorney s intent to defraud or
lack thereof is irrelevant when drawing
checks on clients trust account to pay per
sonal expenses
* 10 Disciplinary Proceedings
An
attorney has a duty to keep separate and
properly account for client trust funds en
trusted to the attorney and to promptly pay
over and deliver such funds to the client
upon request
11 Disciplinary Proceedings
An
attorney may not use client trust funds to
cover business expenses
12 Disciplinary Proceedings
To
determine whether and to what extent dis
ciphne should be imposed it is necessary
that the following factors be considered
(1) the nature of the offense (2) the need
for deterring others (3) the maintenance of
the reputation of the bar as a whole (4) the
protection of the public, (6) the attitude of
the offender generally and (6) his present
or future fitness to continue in the practice
of law
13 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis
appropriation of client funds as one of the
most serious violations of duty an attorney
owes to his client the public and the
courts typically warrants disbarment
14 Disciplinary Proceedings
In
the hierarchy of offenses for which law
yers may be disciplined stealing from a
client must be among those at the very top
of the list
15 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis
appropriation affects both the bar and the
public because it is a serious offense in
volving moral turpitude
16 Disciplinary Proceedings Con
version
Receiving a clients funds and
converting them to personal use by placing
them in an office account without consent
of the client is illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude
17 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis
appropriation is more than a grievous
breach of professional ethics It violates
basic notions of honesty and endangers
public confidence in the legal profession
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18. Disciplinary Proceedings. The
paramount purpose of the "moral turpitude" standard is not to punish practitioners but to protect the public, the courts,
and the profession ^ a g a i n s t unsuitable
practitioners.
19. Disciplinary Proceedings. Mitigating circumstances shown in the record
should be considered in determining the
appropriate discipline imposed on an attorney violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
20. Disciplinary Proceedings: Intent: Circumstantial Evidence. Intent to
misappropriate client funds may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
21. Disciplinary Proceedings. Cumulative acts of attorney misconduct are
distinguishable from isolated incidents of
neglect and therefore justify more serious
sanctions.
22. Disciplinary Proceedings: Intent. If a misappropriation occurs through
an attorney's laxity rather than wrongful
intent, and if this lack of intent is reinforced by the attorney's having taken remedial action immediately upon discovery
of the problem, less discipline than disbarment may be appropriate.
23. Disciplinary Proceedings. The
fact that no client suffered any financial
loss is no excuse for a lawyer to misappropriate clients' funds nor any reason why a
lawyer should not receive a severe sanction.
24. Disciplinary Proceedings. To
"determine what sanction is appropriate,
each case justifying discipline of an attorney must be evaluated individually in light
of the particular facts and circumstances.

Alison L. Larson, Asst. Counsel for Discipline, for relator.
Jon S. Reid and Mark E. Novotny of
Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, for
respondent.
HASTINGS, C.J, and BOSLAUGH,
CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and
FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
In this attorney disciplinary proceeding
we find that since he knowingly and wil
fully transferred and commingled clien
trust funds with funds in his and his associ
ated lawyers' law office business account
and because he misappropriated some jp
those funds to his own use and to othe
improper purposes, Douglas Veith should
be disbarred.
Specifically, we find that the record re
veals by clear and convincing evidence tha
Veith violated his oath of office as an attor
ney and Canon 1, DR 1-102, and Canon 9
DR 9-102, of the lawyers'* Code of Profes
sional Responsibility. We agree with th<
relator, the Nebraska State Bar Associa
tion (NSBA), that the 8-month suspensior
recommended
by
the
referee
\i
j^inappropriate under the circumstances
of this case. The 2-year suspension sug
gested by the NSBA Counsel for Discipline
is also too lenient.
[1,2] A proceeding to discipline an at
torney is a trial de novo on the record, ir
which the Supreme Court reaches a conclu
sion independent of the findings of the
referee, provided, where credible evidence
is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the
Supreme Court considers and may give
weight to the fact that the referee heard
and observed the witnesses and accepted
one version of the facts rather than another. State ex ret. NSBA v. Thor, 237 Neb.
734, 467 N.W.2d 666 (1991); State ex rel
NSBA v. Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453
N.W.2d 73 (1990), cert, denied — U.Sl
- ^ - , 111 S.Ct. 153, 112 L.Ed.2d 119. Th<j
Supreme Court, in its de novo review of the
record, must find that the particular complaint has been established by clear an'cj
convincing evidence in order to sustain'ft
against an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts in the record here
reveal that Veith was admitted to the practice of law in, the State of Nebraska in June
1982. At all times relevant, Veith was the
managing attorney in a five-attorney office-sharing arrangement in Bellevue, Ne-

braska. As managing attorney, Veith received the monthly bank statements regarding the general law business and client
trust accounts. Each of the attorneys used
the trust account for his respective clients'
trust funds.
In July 1988, Veith was informed by the
bank that it had transferred funds from
the trust account to the general law business account to cover a shortage of funds.
At various other times Veith transferred or
authorized the transfer of funds to the
business account from the client trust account.
During the period of August 1988
through February 1989, Veith, although he
was generally aware of periodic deficits in
both the trust and business accounts, failed
to reconcile the accounts or take other action to avoid the deficit problem. Between
September 1988 and March 1989, the trust
account had negative balances. At a minimum, throughout this period, it should
have contained $16,900 in client trust
funds. Between l243July 1988 and March
1989, Veith withdrew as income $70,000
from the business account. On March 3,
1989, one of the associated attorneys questioned Veith about the trust account balance. Veith acknowledged that the trust
account had over a $3,000 negative balance.
He secured a $10,000 personal loan from a
bank and deposited that money into the
trust fund that same day to cover the deficiency in the client trust fund account of
the complaining associated lawyer? Subsequently, Veith borrowed $25,000 from a
friend to cover deficiencies in the other
associated attorneys' trust funds. On
March 27, 1989, Veith secured a loan from
a relative in the amount of $10,600, which
he deposited in the trust account to cover
trust funds for which Veith was accountable to his own clients.
Meanwhile, on March 9, 1989, all the
attorneys in the office-sharing arrangement, including Veith, made a conference
call to the NSBA Counsel for Discipline,
explaining the matter and setting in motion
an investigation.
The Committee on Inquiry of the Fourth
Disciplinary District, after an October 16,

1989, hearing, recommended that formal
charges be filed against Veith. These
charges were reviewed by the Disciplinary
Review Board and were filed as an original
action in this court on May 29, 1990. The
formal charges allege that the actions of
Veith, as set forth above, constitute a violation of his oath of office, as provided by
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue 1987), and
of DR 1-102 and DR 9-102.
[31 Section 7-104 provides that every
attorney admitted to practice law in Nebraska shall take and subscribe an oath
swearing to support the Nebraska and U.S.
Constitutions and to faithfully discharge
the duties of an attorney and counselor to
the best of his or her abilities. An attorney's violation of a disciplinary rule and
failure to act competently by neglecting a
matter entrusted to him or her is conduct
violative of an attorney's oath as a member
of the bar. State ex rel. Nebraska State
Bar Assn. v. Divis, 212 Neb. 699, 325
N.W.2d 652 (1982). See State ex rel.
NSBA v. Hahn, 218 Neb 508, 356 N.W 2d
885 (1984) (the oath requires lawyers to
observe the established codes of professional ethics). DR 1-102 and DR 9-102
provide as follows:
j£ 44 DR 1-102 Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds
and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in
one or more identifiable bank or savings
and loan association accounts maintained
in the state in which the law office is

here].^
(B) A lawyer shall:

•S3

(3) Maintain complete records of all
funds, securities, and other properties of
a client coming into the possession of the
lawyer and render appropriate accounts
to his client regarding time. •
Following a formal hearing on November
16, 1990, a referee, on December 7, 1990,
filed her report with this court. The referee found that Veith had violated the disciplinary rules with which he was charged.
The referee recommended, among five components, that Veith be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 8 months.
The NSBA filed an exception to the report,
arguing that the referee's recommendation
of suspension for a period of 8 months was
too lenient under the facts and circumstances as established by the record of this
case.
In his answer to the formal charges,
Veith admits violating DR 1-102(A)(1) and
DR 9-102(B)(3) but none of the other enumerated provisions of DR 1-102 or DR
9-102. In essencej 245Veith admits to commingling the business and client trust fund
accounts but attributes it to negligence.
He denies attempting to intentionally or
dishonestly convert the funds, perpetrate a
fraud, or deceive or misrepresent matters
to his associated counsel or clients. In
contrast, the NSBA argues that Veith has
gone beyond commingling and has converted or willfully misappropriated the client
trust funds.
COMMINGLING AND
MISAPPROPRIATION
[4-10] In attorney discipline proceedings, conversion refers to an attorney's
misappropriation of a client's property to
the attorney's own use or some other improper use. See ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct 45:106
(1985). Misappropriation is "any unauthorized use . . . of clients' funds entrusted to
[a lawyer], including not only stealing, but

uenves any personal gain or benefit ther?
froh ' In re Wilson, 81 J.J. 451, 455 rijfl
409 A.2d 1153, 1155 n. 1 (1979). See Bq%
v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.3d 2§jy
801 P.2d 412, 276 Cal.Rptr. 169 (1990) gS
attorney's failure to^use entrusted fun§«
for the purpose for which they were.ej
trusted constitutes misappropriation). MJai
appropriation caused by serious, inexcusa?
ble violation of a duty to oversee entrustef
funds is deemed willful, even in the^ah?
sence of a deliberate wrongdoing. Edwards v. State Bar of California, £2
Cal.3d 28, 801 P.2d 396, 276 Cal.Rptr u f
(1990). See, Giovanazzi v. State BaVqf
California, 28 Cal.3d 465, 619 P.2d '1005*
169 Cal.Rptr. 581 (1980) (mere fact that •sag
ai
attorney s trust account balance falls below,
the amount deposited in and purportedly!
held in trust supports a finding of misajS
propriation); Matter of Iversen, 51 A.D.2q
422, 381 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1976) (an a c t ' S j
conversion is complete when the clients?
trust account is overdrawn or when?
through mismanagement or misconduct or?j
the part of the attorney, the balance of t h 9
account is less than the clients' i n t e r e s t ^
it). Thus, under DR 9-102, w r o n g f u l ^
improper intent is not an element of misapS
propriation. See, In re Wilson, suprafe
Archer v. State, 548 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.Cfv|
App.1977) (DR 9-102 does not require, ettSj
ments of fraud, culpability, or willfulness^
Stately.
Stoveken, 68 Wis.2d 716," 229J
N.W.2d 224 (1975) (attorney's intent to S g |
fraud or lack thereof is irrelevant wherij
drawing checks on clients' trust account &1
pay personal expenses).

.1

[11,12] We have held that an attorneyj
has a duty to keep separate and properly |
account for client trust funds entrustedJto
the attorney and to promptly pay over ahoL
deliver such funds to the client *upon re-j
quest. See State ex rel. NSBA v. StaV\
more, 218 Neb. 138, 352 N.W.2d 875 (1984)/l
See, also, DR 9-102. An attorney may no'fj
use client^trust funds to cover ' business*
expenses. *See, In re Leiois, 118 I11.2d 357?
113 Ill.Dec. 287, 515 N.E.2d 96 (1987) (pro-^
fessional corporation's operating account);

5(1981) (business debts); Bar Assn. v. tain respect due courts). "'In the hier* Thompson 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 433 N.E.2d archy of offenses for whiv.n lawyers may
'$02 (1982) (overhead and operating ex- be disciplined, stealing from a client must
penses). Based upon Veith's admissions be among those at the very top of the
and other clear and convincing evidence in list.' " The Florida Bar v. McShirley, 573
the record, this court finds that Veith, by So.2d 807, 808 (Fla.1991), quoting The Florknowingly commingling and misappro- ida Bar v. Tunsil, 503 So.2d 1230 (Fla.
priating trust funds, inexcusably breached 1986).
his oath of office and his duty to his clients
[15] Misappropriation affects both the
and to the clients of the lawyers sharing bar and the public because it is a serious
office space with him. In short, the clear offense involving moral turpitude. See, In
and convincing evidence reflects that Veith re Phillips, 767 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1989) (reis guilty of each of the charges brought ceiving client's funds and converting them
against him.
to personal use by placing them in office
account without consent of client is illegal
DISCIPLINE
conduct involving moral turpitude); Bam[13] The next step is to determine the bic v. State Bar of California, 40 Cal.3d
appropriate sanction. To determine wheth- 314, 707 P.2d 862, 219 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1985)
er and to what extent discipline should be (misappropriation of client funds involves
imposed it is necessary that the following moral turpitude and undermines public confactors be considered: (1) the nature of the fidence in legal profession); In re Patt, 81
offense, (2) the need for deterring others, I11.2d 447, 43 Ill.Dec. 737, 410 N.E.2d 870
(3) the maintenance of the reputation of the (1980) (conversion of a client's funds is an
bar as a whole, (4) the protection of the act involving moral turpitude). "Misappropublic, (5) the attitude of the offender gen- priation is more than a grievous breach of
erally, and (6) his present or future fitness professional ethics. It violates basic noto continue in the practice of law. State ex tions of honesty and endangers public conrel NSBA v. Thor, 237 Neb. 734, 467 fidence in the legal profession." Grim v.
N.W.2d 666 (1991); State ex rel. NSBA v. State Bar of California, 53 Cal.3d 21, 29,
Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453 N.W.2d 73 805 P.2d 941, 943, 278 Cal.Rptr. 682, 684
(1990), cert denied — U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. (1991). " 'The most common definition of
an act of moral turpitude is one that is
153, 112 L.Ed.2d 119.
"contrary to honesty and good morals."
' [14] There is no question that misappro[citations.]' . . . ' "The paramount purpose
priation of client funds, as oneof the most
of the 'moral turpitude' standard is not to
serious violations of duty an attorney owes
punish practitioners but to protect the pubto his client, the public, and the courts,
lic, the courts, and the profession against
typically warrants disbarment. See, State,
"'"
In re
ex rel Hunter, v. Hatteroth, 134 Neb. 451, unsuitable practitioners
279 N.W. 153 (1938) (misappropriation by Scott, 52 Cal.3d 968, 978, 802 P.2d 985, 991,
an attorney ofj^money belonging to his 277 Cal.Rptr. 201, 207 (1991).
This court disagrees with Veith's assessclient is such a disregard of duty as to
warrant disbarment); State, ex rel. Hunt- ment that his violation did not involve morer, v. Boe, 134 Neb. 162, 278 N.W. 144 al turpitude. At various times, by his own
(1938) (an attorney is subject to disbarment admission, Veith knowingly transferred
because of delinquency in accounting to money from the client trust account to the
clients for money received in his profes- business account of his law office. He
sional capacity, in violation of his duty to j_£48admitted that during this period 20 perthe public); State, ex rel. Spillman, v. cent of the money from the trust fund was
Priest, 118 Neb. 47, 223 N.W. 635 (1929) used by him personally and 80 percent was
(delinquency in accounting for money re- used for salaries and other office expenses.

new leabeu computer system mat cost
$2,000 p - month, and upda^J his law library, all so he would appear successful.
This court also disagrees with Veith's
assessment that his conduct does not affect
his present or future fitness to continue in
the practice of law. In his new partnership
arrangement Veith has taken steps so that
he cannot sign checks on either the trust or
business account. While admirable, this
situation creates a paralogism. Veith asks
this court and his clients to trust him, yet
he apparently has some question as to his
own trustworthiness.
MITIGATING FACTORS
[16] This court must next determine
whether there are factors which would mitigate the sanction of disbarment, suggesting that a lesser sanction may be more
appropriate.
Mitigating circumstances
shown in the record should be considered in
determining the appropriate discipline imposed on an attorney violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. State ex rel
NSBA v. Miller, 225 Neb. 261, 404 N.W.2d
40 (1987).
Respondent presents an array of arguments, starting with a lack of intent. "As
the term is used in attorney discipline
cases, 'willful misappropriation' covers a
broad range of conduct varying significantly in the degree of culpability." Edwards
v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.3d 28,
38, 801 P.2d 396, 402, 276 Cal.Rptr. 153,
159 (1990). Therefore, misconduct, although technically willful, may be less culpable if committed as a result of negligence
and not as a result of a deliberate act.
Veith's argument is that he negligently
rather than deliberately breached his duty.
The record does not support this contention. He was aware that the bank transferred funds from the trust account to the
business account but he took no action.
He also transferred or authorized some
transfers from the client trust fund account to the business account. That Veith
knowingly and intentionally misappropriat-

trust account to the la*" office busines
account because he was running short jo
money. The minister understood Vei^
considered the transfer to be a temporal
"quick-fix" which he'would fix later.
[17,18] Intent to misappropriate clien
funds may be inferred from circumstantia
evidence. See In re Phelps, 306 Or/ 508
760 P.2d 1331 (1988). See, also, NJI 14.f
("Intent is a mental process and it there
fore generally remains hidden within thl
mind where it is conceived. It is rarely Ij
ever susceptible of proof by direct ev?
dence. It may, however, be inferred froir
the words and acts of the defendant an<3
from the facts and circumstances surrounding his conduct"). Perhaps the initial
transfer of funds was due to Veith's negligence. However, the first transfer wal
not an isolated incident. There were re;
peated incidents in which Veith knew tha!t
the bank was transferring funds from'the
client trust fund account to the business
account after the initial transaction. There
were various times he authorized a transP
fer or personally transferred funds from'
the trust account to the business account?
See State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, 232
Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161 (1989) (cumuhP
tiVe acts of attorney misconduct are distinguishable from isolated incidents of neglect'
and therefore justify more serious sane-!
tions). Veith never made an accounting1
over the period in question. At the same
time he received a salary of approximately}
$70,000.
[19] Veith's next argument is that no'
client was injured because he made full
restitution. He relies upon State ex rel\
NSBA v. Fitzgerald, 227 Neb. 90, 41^
N.W.2d 28 (1987), for the proposition that'
restitution of the misused funds1 prior to
being faced with accountability may mitP
gate the discipline to be imposed and appar-'
ently evidences a lack of wrongful intent..^
The problem for Veith is that, although he;
was not yet faced with formal accountabili-,,
ty, the restitution he provided was not'
made until after he was confronted by an'/

ues> rnigni not suner unanciai loss oecause
of Vc Ji's misappropriate .> Veith filed
bankruptcy both personally and for his
business on January 13, 1990. His innocent lenders may or may not suffer a financial loss. Regardless of whether the lenders are or are not reimbursed, the fact that
no client suffered any financial loss is no
excuse for a [25ilawyer to misappropriate
clients' funds nor any reason why a lawyer
should not receive a severe sanction. See,
In the Matter of Galloway, 278 S.C. 615,
300 S.E.2d 479 (1983) (restitution of converted funds may have little or no effect in
mitigating the sanction); Greenbaum v.
State Bar, 15 Cal.3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126
Cal.Rptr. 785 (1976) (fact that client was
not and would not be harmed by attorney's
action was irrelevant); Heavey v. State
Bar, 17 Cal.3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131
Cal.Rptr. 406 (1976) (fact that client suffers
no harm is mere fortuity) But see, Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Larre, 457 So 2d
649 (La.1984) (repayment of funds along
with severe depression and lack of prior
disciplinary record may act as mitigating
factors); The Florida Bar v. Whitlock, 426
So.2d 955 (Fla.1982) (depositing personal
One of the purposes of DR 1-102 and DR funds into client trust accounts to bring
9-102 of the Code of Professional Responsi- them back to their proper balances will not
bility is to protect innocent persons from
excuse the lawyer of his conversion, but
suffering any financial loss because of any
where there is no permanent financial loss
misappropriation of funds by lawyers. In
to client a lighter sanction may be imthis case, Veith's contention that any sancposed).
tion should be mitigated because no lawFactors which do favor mitigation are
yer's client suffered any financial loss is
not persuasive. Veith borrowed $10,000 that Veith (1) was in good standing and
from a bank, $25,000 from a friend, and free from disciplinary complaint or penalty,
$10,600 from a relative to restore those (2) has exhibited an attitude of regret and
funds in the trust account which he had remorse, (3) has sought and received counmisappropriated. On October 16, 1989, seling, (4) has a good reputation in the
when asked by a member of the Committee community, (5) has cooperated fully with
on Inquiry where he stood on these loans, the Counsel for Discipline, and (6) has apVeith replied- "Very seriously within the parently provided many pro bono hours.
last 48 to 72 hours my wife and I have
CONCLUSION
seriously sat down and talked about bankruptcy and that's a very serious considera[21,22] Veith cites a myriad of cases
tion to the point where we've formulated a comparing various misconduct violations
plan to potentially do that "
and their resulting sanctions
None of
[20] Because Veith borrowed money those are binding on this court's decision.
and reimbursed the funds he misappropri- To determine what sanction is appropriate,

fornia Si^ erne Court has re gnized the
principle that if the misappropriation occurs through the attorney's laxity rather
than wrongful intent, and if this lack of
intent is reinforced by the attorney's having taken remedial p a c t i o n immediately
upon discovery of the problem, less discipline than disbarment may be appropriate.
See Waysman v. State Bar of California,
41 Cal.3d 452, 714 P.2d 1239, 224 Cal Rptr.
101 (1986); Palomo v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal.3d 785, 685 P.2d 1185, 205
Cal.Rptr. 834 (1984). Even if this court
were to accept Veith's position that he was
merely negligent, he would not fall within
this sound principle because over a course
of almost 8 months, although he knew and
participated in the transfer of funds from
the trust account to the law office business
account, he took no action to restore the
trust funds. It was not until he was confronted that he confessed to any wrongdoing. Cf. State ex rel NSBA v Miller,
supra (attorney made restitution of converted funds more than 2 years prior to a
complaint filed against him and without
threat of disciplinary action).
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each case justifying discipline of an attorney must be evaluated individually in light
of the particular facts and circumstances
State ex rel NSBA v Miller, 225 Neb 261,
404 N W 2 d 40 (1987) Disbarment has
been, and continues to be, a viable sanction
in cases involving serious breach of disciph
nary rules
There has been a trend in recent years
toward lighter sanctions, a trend this court
is convinced must be reversed The corre
lation between the decline of public confi
dence in the legal | ^profession and the
trend toward lighter attorney discipline
sanctions is no coincidence
"[Excuses such as] a 'lack of intent to
deprive the client of his money' or 'per
sonal hardship'
stand out like an
invitation to the lawyer who is in finan
cial difficulty for one reason or another
All too often he is willing to risk a slap
on the wrist, and even a little ignominy,
hoping he won't get caught, but knowing
that if he is he can plead restitution, but
[sic] duly contrite, and escape the ultimate punishment The profession and
the public suffer as a consequence The
willful misappropriation of client funds
should be the Bar's equivalent of a capi
tal offense The [sic] should be no ex
cuses "
The Florida Bar v Breed, 378 So 2d 783,
784 (Flal979) (Florida Supreme Court
quoting a referee and giving notice that it
would not be reluctant to disbar an attor
ney for this type of offense, reversing past
trend of suspension as only discipline)
Notwithstanding the mitigating factors
in Veith's favor, the facts that Veith com
mingled trust funds with his law office
funds and willfully misappropriated them
lead this court to conclude that m this case
disbarment is the only appropnate sane
tion Veith is directed to pay costs in ac
cordance with Neb Rev Stat §§ 7-114 and
7-115 (Reissue 1987)

238 Neb 268
J ^ S T A T E of Nebraska, Appellee,
v
Aaron C GIBBS, Appellant
Nos 81-920, 82-026 and 82-027
Supreme Court of Nebraska
June 7, 1991

Defendant was cdnvicted and
tenced following guilty pleas to felon?
charges of burglary, escape, and ' t a g
counts of receiving stolen property by tn£
District Court, Douglas County, John Et
Clark and Donald J Hamilton, JJ Defeg
dant's consolidated appeals were reinstated
as direct appeals by decision from Unite|
States Court of Appeals on grounds W
ineffective assistance of counsel, raisedjn
habeas corpus petition, 881 F 2d 1080 Thf
Supreme Court, Colwell, District JudgV
Retired, held that (1) photographic array
in burglary investigation was not unduly
suggestive, (2) trial court's failure to "Sgvise that guilty pleas could result in conseV
utive sentences was not error, (3) eight^
month unexplained trial delay was not denl
al of defendant's right to speedy trial, ^(4£
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel were remedied by reinstatement (ft
direct appeal, and (5) aggregate senteiicJ
of ten to nineteen years' imprisonment w &
not excessive
Affirmed

1. Criminal Law <®=>1158(4)

JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT

In determining correctness of trial
court's ruling on suppression motion, Su^
preme Court will uphold trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clear-,
ly erroneous

WHITE, J , not participating

2 CrimnTal Law <S=>1158(4)
In reviewing trial court's findings of
fact m its ruling on suppression motion,^
Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence4

C • a* 470 N WM 558 (Neb 1991)

^ resolve conflicts in evidence, but rather,
recognizes trial court as finder of fact and
takes into consideration that trial court has
observed witness testifying in regard to
iuch motions
\ Criminal Law <s=339 7(1)
** Whether photographic array identifica
tion procedures are unduly suggestive and
conducive to substantial likelihood of irrep
arable mistake in identification is to be
determined by consideration of totality of
circumstances surrounding procedures
4 Criminal Law <S=>339 7(4)
^ Photographic array used to identify
burglary defendant was not unduly sug
gestive, even though defendant was only
^individual depicted without facial hair
fence array included five individuals victim
?
remembered defendant because of defen
'dant's face, nose, and eyes and defendant
t was not singled out from other four indi
TViduals by dress height, weight age or
k
hair style Neb Rev St § 28-507(1)
5 Criminal Law <s=1169 1(5)
,
Any error in photographic array identi
fication procedure was harmless since vie
tim's identification of defendant at trial
was supported independently by victim's
observations at time of burglary, thus de
nial of suppression motion was not error
Neb Rev St § 28-507(1)

8 Criminal Law <fc=»577 \$W
Failure to move for discharge prior to
trial or entry of guilty plea or nolo conten
dere constitutes waiver of right to speedy
trial
Neb Rev St § 29-1209
USCA
Const Amend 6, Const Art 1 § 13
9 Criminal Law <S=>228
Right to speedy preliminary hearing in
trial is relative and depends upon existing
circumstances right is not denied where
delay is satisfactorily explained by govern
ment and defendant is brought to trial as
soon* as reasonably possible
USCA
Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13
10 Criminal Law «=>228, 264
Unexplained delay between arrest and
arraignment or preliminary hearing does
not demonstrate violation of right to
speedy trial in absence of prejudice U S
CA Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13
11 Criminal Law <s=>577 10(3) 577 15(1)
Eight month delay between date of
burglary defendant s preliminary hearing
and trial did not violate right to speedy
trial where there was no showing that de
lay was purposeful or oppressive and de
fendant made no showing that pretrial de
lay caused substantial prejudice to right to
fair trial
Neb Rev St § 29-1207 U S
CA Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13

12 Criminal Law <a>641 13(1)
6 Criminal Law <s=>273 1(4)
To sustain claim of ineffective assist
'
In order to support finding .that plea of
ance of counsel defendant must show that
guilty or nolo contendere has been volun
counsel's performance was deficient and
tanly entered, trial court must inform de
fendant concerning nature of charge, right that such deficient performance prejudiced
to assistance of counsel, right to confront defendant, prejudice requires demonstra
• witnesses against defendant, right to jury tion of reasonable probability that but for
counsel's deficient performance result of
i trial, pnvilege against self incrimination
and possible range of penalties for each proceedings would have been different
U S C A Const Amend 6 Const Art 1
-crime U S C A Const Amend 6
§ 11
7. Criminal Law «=>273 1(4)
13 Criminal Law <fc=1131(7)
Trial court's failure to inform defen
Claims that defendant received ineffec
dant that sentences for escape and theft
guilty pleas might run consecutively did tive assistance of counsel at time of direct
appeals from four felony convictions were
not make defendant's guilty pleas involun
remedied by reinstatement of appeals
tary, explanation of possible range of pen
alties for each crime was sufficient Neb
U S C A Const Amend 6 Const Art 1
£ e v S t §§ 28-517 28-518 28-912(1)
§ 11
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would be excused for his naivete, but
whether he must be disbarred in spite of i t
To the extent Wilson precludes us from
considering the entire record in misappropriation cases, I am no longer satisfied that
it is necessary for the Court to follow its
mandate unreservedly. I believe the Wilson rule should continue to guide the Court
in determining the discipline to be imposed
in the vast majority of misappropriation
cases. Those determinations, however,
would in my view better reflect the collective wisdom of the Court and better serve
the interests of the bar and the public if
they were tempered by a recognition that
under special circumstances discipline short
of disbarment may occasionally be appropriate in knowing misappropriation cases.
All of this Court's resources—its experience, discretion, compassion, insight, and
judgment—are brought to bear in deciding
the wide variety of cases on its docket.
We need not limit our available resources
when we decide attorney-discipline cases
involving the alleged misappropriation of
clients' funds.

ORDERED that all funds, if any,*
rently existing in any New Jersey fixM
institution maintained by M I C H A M
KONOPKA, pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, u
be restrained from disbursement exS
upon application to this Court, for^ji
cause shown, pending the further OrdeY
this Court, and it is further
"'
ORDERED that respondent shall reg
burse the Ethics Financial Committee^
appropriate administrative costs incurred
the prosecution of this matter.

126 NJ. 261
J26iln the Matter of Michael J. BELL^jj
an Attorney-at-Law.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued Sept. 26, 1989.
Decided Oct. 4, 1991.

Justices O'HERN and GARIBALDI join
in this opinion.
\2wF0r suspension—Chief Justice
WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD,
HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.
Opposed—None.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that MICHAEL A. KONOPKA of PASSAIC, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 1971, is hereby
suspended for six months, effective October 28, 1991, and until the further Order of
the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent shall be restrained and enjoined from practicing law
during the period of his suspension and
that he shall comply with Administrative
Guideline 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics, which governs suspended attorneys;
and it is further
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In attorney disciplinary proceeding^
the Supreme Court held that knowing misappropriation of client funds, even if not
for personal gain, warrants disbarment^!
Disbarment ordered.
Stein, J., filed opinion concurring^
part and dissenting in part, with .whicjj
O'Hern and Garibaldi, JJ., joined.

Attorney and Client <s=*58
Knowing misappropriation of clienrt"
funds warrants disbarment, even though
use of funds is not for personal gain, ancf
despite personal problems. Code of Pro?."
Resp., DR 9-102.

John J. Janasie, Deputy Ethics Counsel/
Westfield, argued the cause on behalf of'
Office of Attorney Ethics.

,, Matthew Boylan, for respondent (Lowenjtein, Sandler, Kohl, Fisher & Boylan,
Roseland, attorneys).
PER CURIAM.
This matter stems from three complaints
filed against respondent following an audit
iof his books and records. The District VI
Ethics Committee (Ethics Committee)
found that respondent had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4); had
overreached clients in charging excessive
fees, in violation of DR 2-106(D); had vio^lated record keeping regulations, R. 1:21-6
and DR 9-l02(B)(3) and (C); had failed to
'preserve the identity of client funds, in
violation of DR 1-102(A); and had engaged
in otherj^activities adversely reflecting
on his fitness to practice law, in violation of
DR 1-102(A)(6). Although it found that
'respondent had misused trust funds, the
Ethics Committee did not determine whethe r the misuse was knowing.
The Disciplinary Review Board (DRB)
agreed substantially with the Ethics Committee's findings. In addition, the DRB
found that respondent knowingly misappropriated client funds in three separate matters. Accordingly, the DRB recommended
that respondent be disbarred. Three dissenting members of the DRB found respondent's misuse of client funds to be negligent and recommended a three-year suspension.
Our independent review of the record
leads us to conclude that respondent knowingly misappropriated client funds and that
he must be disbarred. Because of that
-conclusion, this opinion is concerned, to the
exclusion of other allegations of attorney
misconduct, solely with the issue of knowing misappropriation. Within that context,
we further limit the opinion to the acts of
misappropriation that occurred after the
publication of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451,
409 A2d 1153 (1979).
I
The record clearly and convincingly establishes that respondent knowingly misap-

propriated trust funds in two post-Wilson
matters. In the first, his clients were
James and Maryann Maguire, and in the
second, his client was his cousin, Maurice
Spagnoletti.
The DRB summarized the facts in these
two matters:
In the Maguire matter, for instance,
respondent deposited two checks in his
trust account, one for $9,300 and the
other for $1,000, representing the deposit
tendered by the purchasers of the Maguires' property Those deposits were
made on December 1, 1979, and January
9, 1980, respectively. Notwithstanding
the fact that no disbursements were
made on the Maguires' behalf until
March 31, 1980, the trust account balance was only $1,697 12 on December 31,
1979, $968.98 on January 7, 1980,
$1,053.07 on January 31, 1980, and $12 98
on February 29, 1980 However, respondent should have held $10,300 in trust
for the Maguires until March 31, 1980
Thus, the trust account shortage in Maguire ranged from more than $8,000 to
more than $10,000
$8,000 of that
l2638hortage resulted from two payments
to respondent in December one check
for $3,000 which cleared on December 12,
1979, and a second check for $5,000 payable to respondent, which cleared on De
cember 17, 1979
At the ethics hearing of January 14,
1987, respondent conceded that there
was a trust account shortage in connection with the Maguire transaction. He
testified that he was unable to explain
the reason for the shortage as a result of
the destruction of all his records by a fire
in his office in late 1979 He recalled,
however, that "there were monies that
were supposed to come from (client) Mai
fettone which did not come which caused
a shortage. And I believe the same day,
I made a loan .
which satisfied the
overdraft." Indeed, the record shows—
and respondent so admitted—that m
April 1980 he obtained a $35,000 loan
which he deposited in his trust account to
cover a shortage in connection with "one
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of the two real estate transactions."
Similarly, in the Spagnoletti matter,
on June 18, 1980, respondent's trust liability to his client consisted of $20,074.64.
On that date, however, the trust account
balance was only $18,137.68. From June
23 through July 7, 1980, respondent's
trust liability to Spagnoletti amounted to
$15,051.44. On June 23, however, the
trust account balance was only $12,022.04 and, by July 7, 1980, it had declined to $1,903.60. The three largest
decreases in the trust account balance
were the result of three checks of $3,000
each made payable to respondent. Those
' checks were dated July 1, July 2, and
July 5, 1980. (Exhibit P-9 attached to
the complaint). The July 1 and July 2
checks were cashed on those same days;
the July 5 check was cashed on July 7,
1980 (Exhibit P-8 attached to the complaint).
[Footnote and transcript references
omitted.]
From these facts, the DRB concluded:
It matters not that respondent might not
have utilized those funds for his own
gain, as he contends. In re Wilson, supra, 81 NJ at 455 n. 1 [409 A2d 1153];
In re Noonan, [102 NJ. 157, 160, 506
A.2& 722 (1986).]
The record is replete with clear instances of knowing misappropriation of
trust funds. In the absence of an outright admission, circumstantial evidence
can lead to the conclusion that a lawyer
knew or had to know clients' funds were
being invaded. Matter of Johnson, 105
N.J. 249, 258 [520 A2d 3] (1987).
By respondent's own admission, beginning in December, when he had a coronary bypass operation, and during the
relevant times mentioned in the complaint, 1978 through 1980, "I really didn't
feel I was practicing law." I had no
"outside office. I was using my home.
I wasn't listed. I (did not) believe I had
an office phone. I didn't have a secre-

tary
I had no sign; a n d j ^ s o l i c i t any business. The' only
was doing was for people I had a
al relationship with." According
spondent cannot argue that t h e *
of his practice, combined with
that he was a sole practitioner, p
him from closely examining his'
count records and that, consei
any misuse of client funds was ne
• not intentional. As the Court V
Matter of Johnson, supra, 105
260 [520 A.2d 3] (1987):
'
[W]e do not intend to sugges
henceforth a respondent wjidj
walks away from his fiducia
gation as safekeeper of clienv
can expect this Court to take an
gent view of any misapprppi
We will view "defensive igno:
with a jaundiced eye. The intei
and purposeful avoidance of JOK
what is going on in one s trust ac
will not be deemed a shield^ a
proof of what would otherwise
"knowing misappropriation." *X
may be semantical inconsistencies
we are confident that within our j
system, there is sufficient diffe_
between intentional ignorance ^rihji
gitimate lack of knowledge. "A
[Transcript references omitted.]
. In Wilson, we declared, in now fai
language, that a misappropriation is .
unauthorized use by the lawyer of ch
funds entrusted to him, including not
stealing, but also unauthorized tern,
use for the lawyer's own purpose, *wh
or not he derives any personal f£a|
benefit therefrom." 81 N.J. at 455'~
409 A2d 1153. Knowing misappropriaj
"consists simply of a lawyer's takinj
client's money entrusted to him, kn(
that it is the client's money and knt
that the client has not authorized the
ing." In re Noonan, 102 NJ 157,160,
AM 722 (1986). In both the Maguire^
Spagnoletti matters, as the DRB cohclu

1. Respondent admitted to allegations of the Ethics Committee complaint that on April 19, 1980,
he was out-of-trust to the Maguires by over
$21,000. The Ethics Committee established the
deficit by deducting from the proceeds of the

sale of the Maguire's existing home the coi
that sale and of the purchase of their new fijj
On April 14, respondent brought the ac^ji
into balance by depositing the above-descr
$35,000 loan.
• !i!W

j
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^ r e c o r d is replete with clear instances
ftfjoiowing misappropriation of trust
§>ur examination of the record reveals
Jt'during the period he handled the MaJJrV and Spagnoletti matters, respondent
R£i his trust account both as a business
Kount and as a personal account to ac$8modate some of his friends, generally
Sefly acquaintances whose bills responKt s paid. Respondent regularly paid
tese bills regardless of whether sufficient
$fds were in his trust account to cover the
S&nditures. The practice began before
^publication of Wilson and continued
Jereafter. Respondent described his use
trust funds for his friends in the late
fOs:
fJl&A. Well, at the time, I know I had a
Mot of personal problems; and, quite honestly, I don't think I was putting in the
ittention to the accounts that probably
lormally I would have had before 1976.
ajBut I had records. I knew who had
Jnoney in the account, and who had to
fgive me money, you know, at all times.
„.';' Well, would it ever come an occasion
where you made an advance for [your
Jriend], and he owed the money, and you
jjpaid out money on his behalf despite the
fact that you didn't have it?
(No response.)
tQ. ' You didn't have it from him to make
he disbursement?
Oh, yeah. That happened a number

p' times -

3 $ . . And would that be the reason that
your trust account might have been defic i e n t in those areas by virtue of doing
iphe work you were doing for these particular [friends]?
Well, at certain times, yeah, I would
a s s u m e it would.
^Respondent justifies his misuse of
Rents' funds because of his personal problems. In 1975, respondent's father died,
*fid in the following year, respondent underwent double bypass heart surgery. After this operation, respondent essentially
S^sed accepting clients. He completed
pending matters and accepted new matters

from friends only. In 1977, respondent's
brother committed suicide. The following
year respondent developed a nervous condition and impotency due to a diabetic condition. In 1979, because of an automobile
accident, he was hospitalized for one month
with two herniated discs and related back
ailments. In December of that year, his
residence, in which his office was located,
burned down. Finally, in May 1980, his
mother suffered a stroke.
The thrust of respondent's argument is
that his personal problems so distracted
him that he could not diligently manage his
trust account. He admitted, however, that
he knew that it was unethical to use client
funds without authorization. Furthermore,
contrary to his asserted inability to manage
his trust account from 1978 to 1980, respondent perceived himself during this period as possessing sufficient financial expertise to manage the affairs of others. In
this regard, he testified:
Q. Now, going back to the Maguire real
estate transactions with Burch [the preWilson matter], could you, as an attorney since 1960—did you understand
1266that when you received the funds of
$9300 and $1000, that these funds were
to be held by you and not to be disbursed
until the closing?
A. As a lawyer, as a matter of general
knowledge, of course, I know that I have
to say, though, my state of mind was
such that whatever you want to call it,
neglect, lack of concern, whatever * * V
I was not conducting a law practice,
although I may have filed a tax return
listing myself as a lawyer; but I certainly was not the same lawyer I was * * *.
Q. I won't argue with you; but despite
the fact that you might not have been
the same lawyer that you were, you did
know even at that time that this is what
was supposed to be done with the money?
A. I admit that, yes.
Q. Mr. Bell, other than your practice as
an attorney at law, would you consider
yourself to have any expertise in any
other area.
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A. Yes.
Q. What area would that be?
A. Financial.
Q. During the years 1978, 1979, and
1980, would you still have considered
yourself to be an expert in the area of
finances?
A. Yes.
Respondent does not deny that using his
business account as a trust account was
improper or that his record keeping was
shoddy and haphazard. Lawyers, as we
have said, "have a duty to assure that their
accounting practices are sufficient to prevent misappropriation of trust funds." In
re Fleischer, 102 NJ. 440, 447, 508 A 2d
1115 (1986). As fiduciaries, lawyers are
obliged to know whether their trust accounts are in balance. Here, the conclusion is inescapable that respondent knew
he was using client funds without authorization. It makes no difference that respondent did not use any of the funds for his
own purposes or that no client suffered
from his misappropriation. In re Noonan,
supra, 102 NJ. at 160, 506 A2d 722.

istrative costs, including the costsjfij
scripts.
r lixmffl
STEIN, J., concurring in par$Ji9
dissenting in part.
**J<?9
I expressed the view in In re Kan
126 NJ 225, 596 A.2d 733 (l&ffl
although the Wilson rule i s „ 3 j j
rule for the vast^majority of misajra
ation cases, the inflexibility with wr
can be applied runs the risk of $ 3
within our attorney-discipline syste
almost reflexive approach to s u d y
obscuring and ignoring the indivjdiB
cumstances to an intolerable "me
[Id. at 241, 596 AM 733.] .jjgffl
I observed that the Court's disposltio
misappropriation cases "would in 'myS
better reflect the collective wisdonH?
Court and better serve the interests B
bar and the public if they were teml
by a recognition that under special cir
stances discipline short of disbarra^n?
occasionally be appropriate in knowing
appropriation cases." Id. at 259, §96i

Respondent's claim that his physical and
The Court's opinion cites two insja
mental problems excuse or mitigate his of respondent's knowing misapproprk
misappropriations are likewise unavailing. both of which allegedly occurred4afte]
Nothing in the record establishes that his spondent had undergone double, Jyg
problems caused his misappropriations. In heart surgery and had ceased ,accep
re Jacob, 95 NJ. 132, 137, 469 A. 2d 498 new matters other than for friends.\At
(1984). Absent a "demonstration by com- District Ethics Committee hearing uvT
petent medical proofs that respondent suf- .respondent was unable to justify'thejr
fered a loss of competency, comprehension account shortage in one client's funay
or will of a magnitude that could excuse concededly had existed in 1980, explaB
egregious ^misconduct," his physical or that a fire J26shad destroyed his^'w
mental condition will not excuse the know- records in 1979. The evidence of knew
ing misuse of client funds. Ibid.
misappropriation was sufficiently &mt5
ous that three members of the DiscipMJ
Review Board concluded that respondS
II
conduct was negligent, not knowing. %
Although respondent may have endured
record also reflects that any funds'vw
more grief within several years than many
drawn improperly were replaced, no'cli
endure in a lifetime, his suffering did not
having sustained any financial loss ; ^ s
prevent him from knowing what he was
note that respondent voluntarily place-gj
doing when he misused client funds. Acname on the inactive list in 1980, and!
cordingly, we find that respondent knownot practiced law since then.
,UM
ingly misappropriated funds in violation of
The most distinctive aspect of this reoc
DR 9-102 and must be disbarred.
is that respondent attributes his matteng
Respondent shall reimburse the Ethics
to his practice and the resultant misuse]
Financial Committee for appropriate adminclients' funds to a devastating sequence]
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[its affecting respondent and his family,
nowledging that "respondent may have
Sured more grief within several years
'many endure in a lifetime," ante at
^696 A 2d 752, the Court's opinion enu>rates the personal tragedies that responnl' sustained during the period preceding
; alleged misappropriation:
jjjjil975, respondent's father died, and in
he following year, respondent underwent double by-pass heart surgery. AfSer this operation, respondent essentially
jjceased accepting clients. He completed
spending matters and accepted new mat' en for friends only. In 1977, respondent's brother committed suicide. The
following year respondent developed a
niervous condition and impotency due to a
[[diabetic condition. In 1979, because of
Pan automobile accident, he was hospitalFized for one month with two herniated
rdiscs and related back ailments. In Dejcember of that year, his residence, in
Iwhich his office was located, burned
[down. Finally, in May 1980, his mother
|suffered a stroke. [Ante at 265, 596
jpi.2d 752.
g|ln its application of the Wilson rule the
'"tourt has ignored instances of personal
Eragedy in determining discipline for knowjmg misappropriation, see In re Noonan,
|02 NJ. 157, 160, 506 A2d 722 (1986), in
|he absence of proof that the lawyer's
problems actually caused the misappropriation of clients' funds. See In re Jacob, 95
fyj. 132, 137, 469 A.2d 498 (1984). That
Standard of proof heretofore has been
Unattainable by lawyers whose misappropriation of funds has occurred during perigxls of alcohol or drug impairment or in the
yTourse of personal or family tragedy,
jplffiln my view, insistence on proof that
jjhis respondent's
personal
suffering
.'caused him to misappropriate funds is both
^unrealistic and pointless. Our human experience is sufficient to infer a relationship
between severe personal stress and acts of
imprudence or even desperation. The
question should not be one of causation,
but rather whether our disciplinary system
is sufficiently flexible in unique circumstances to temper the imposition of discipline by taking into account the influence

of extraordinary events.
this case.

It should be in

Accordingly, I would not vote to disbar.
In my view, respondent should be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law,
with leave to apply for reinstatement at
such time as respondent is able to demonstrate his fitness to resume practice
* For disbarment—Chief Justice
WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD,
HANDLER and POLLOCK—4
Concurring in part, dissenting in
poW—Justices O'HERN, GARIBALDI and
STEIN—3.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that MICHAEL J
BELL of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted
to the bar of this State in 1960, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys of this State, effective
immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that MICHAEL J BELL be
and hereby is permanently restrained and
enjoined from practicing law, and it is further
ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial
institution maintained by MICHAEL J
BELL, pursuant to Rule 1 21-6, shall be
restrained from disbursement except upon
application to this Court, for good cause
shown, and shall be transferred by the
financial institution to the Clerk of the
Superior Court who is directed to deposit
the funds in the Superior Court Trust
Fund, pending further Order of this Court,
and it is further
j^oORDERED that MICHAEL J. BELL
comply with Administrative Guideline No
23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing
with disbarred attorneys, and it is further
ORDERED that MICHAEL J. BELL reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for
appropriate administrative costs.
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is denied The finding as to the torture
murder special circumstance is reversed
In all other respects we affirm the judg
ment and the penalty imposed by the supe
nor court
LUCAS, C J , PANELLI, KENNARD
and ARABIAN, J J , and EAGLESON J
Assigned *
MOSK, Associate Justice, concurring
I concur in the judgment
I am much disturbed by the fact that the
People considered it desirable to call three
jailhouse informants to testify against de
fendant at his trial Common experience
teaches that such persons "may have good
reason to he
" (United States v Gar
eta (5th Cir 1976) 528 F 2d 580, 588, cf On
Lee v United States (1952) 343 U S 747,
757, 72 S Ct 967 973 96 L Ed 1270 [stat
mg that [t]he use of informers accesso
nes, accomplices false friends or any of
the other betrayals which are dirty busi
ness may raise serious questions of credi
bihty ]) Recent events reveal that they
may also have effective means—sometimes
supplied by governmental authorities
sometimes not—to make their falsehoods
appear rational and persuasive (See Rep
of the 1989-90 Los Angeles County Grand
Jury Investigation of the Involvement of
Jail House Informants in the Cnminal Jus
tice System in Los Angeles County)
In spite of the foregoing review of the
record convinces me that the majority s
disposition is sound Therefore I agree
with the result
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3 Attorney and Client c=>58
Restitution of client funds paid after
commencement of disciplinary proceedings
was not a proper mitigating circumstance
4 Attorney and Client c=r>l(2)
Fact that character witnesses in attor
ney disciplinary proceeding do not know
full extent of misconduct diminishes weight
to be accorded to witnesses testimony
5 Attorney and Client c=>58
Willful misappropriation of client
funds particularly considered with prior
disciplinary sanction for commingling client
funds warrants disbarment

No S014192
Supreme Court of California
In Bank
March 14 1991
Disciplinary
action was
brought
against attorney The review department
of the State Bar Court recommended that
the respondent be disbarred The Supreme
Court held that misappropriation of client
funds warrants disbarment
Disbarred
Mosk J filed a dissenting opinion
1 Attorney and Client 0 5 7
The rule that culpability in state bar
proceedings must be established by con
vincing proof to reasonable certainty and
that reasonable doubts must be resolved in
favor of the attorney is inapplicable to the
issue of appropriate discipline attorney
bears burden of demonstrating that recom
mended discipline is erroneous or lawful
West s
Ann Cal Bus
&
Prof Code
§ 6083(c)
2 Attorney and Client c=>58
Although financial problems can be a
mitigating factor in appropriate state bar
disciplinary cases they are given signifi
cant weight as a mitigating factor in client
fund misappropriation cases only if the fi
nancial problems are extreme and result
from circumstances that are not reasonably
foreseeable or are beyond the attorney s
control

Douglas Paul Grim in pro per
Arthur L Margohs Margohs L Margol
is Los Angeles for petitioner
Diane C Yu Richard J Zanassi Sandra
T Larson and Gael T Infande-Weiss Of
fice of Gen Counsel State Bar of Cahfor
ma San Francisco for respondent
THE COURT
We review the recommendation of the
Review Department of the State Bar Court
(review department) that petitioner Doug
las Paul Grim be disbarred from the prac
tice of law for having wilfully misippropn
ated $5 500 of client funds
Petitioner contends that disbarment is
excessive He argues that the reviev> de
partment s conclusions of law are unsup
ported by the evidence that it failed to
properly weigh the evidence and that it
failed to appropriately weigh mitigating
and aggravating circumstances He main
tains that the interests of the public and
the profession can be adequately safe
guarded by the imposition of a suspension
with probationary monitoring
We conclude that the review depart
ment s recommendation is supported b> the
record that compelling mitigating circum
stances do not clearly predominate and
that disbarment is warranted
I FACTS
Petitioner was admitted to the practice of
law in California in January 1966 In a
prior disciplinary proceeding in 1980 he
was privately reproved for depositing
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$960 30 of a client's funds m his general
account instead of in his client trust ac
count, and for failing to perform services
for the client Petitioner did not return the
funds to the client until after the initiation
of State Bar disciplinary proceedings

B

Evidence in

Mitigation

Petitioner's mitigating evidence centers
on his assertion that he was under extreme
stress because of financial problems at the
time of his misconduct He also cites as
mitigating circumstances his cooperation
with the State Bar and the favorable charA Evidence of Misconduct
acter evidence presented at the heanng
Petitioner's financial distress arose out
Before 1984, petitioner represented Dr
of a troubled business venture Petitioner
Cabrera and his wife in various legal mat
became involved in a business enterprise,
ters In 1984, following the death of Dr
Cabrera, his widow retained petitioner to Agri-Feeds Inc, to produce animal food
represent the estate of her husband in an from waste agncultural cellulose He was
action for breach of contract While the and still is the president, the chairman of
action was pending, Mrs Cabrera moved to the board of directors, and a 98 percent
shareholder of Agri-Feeds In February
Tennessee
1981, petitioner borrowed $731,000, secured
In March 1986, a judgment for $7,021 by his personal real estate holdings, to
construct an Agri-Feeds factory near
was entered in favor of the estate Peti
tioner received payment of the judgment in Stockton In 1982, he borrowed another
April, deposited the funds in his client trust $50,000 to complete construction of the fac
account, and notified Mrs Cabrera of the tory That same year, however, the facto
receipt of the funds
Of the $7,021 re- ry was ordered closed because of air pollu
ceived, petitioner was entitled to $1,432 57 tion problems
for fees and costs, but he used all of the
In 1983, after petitioner had raised an
funds for his own purposes
additional $150,000, Agri-Feeds resumed
Beginning in 1986, petitioner was con- operations In 1984, petitioner raised antacted on various occasions by Mrs Cabre- other $300,000 Agri-Feeds remained in
business until 1985, when it was closed for
ra's Tennessee attorneys, who were at
lack of operating capital In 1986, when
tempting to obtain her funds from petition
the misconduct occurred, petitioner was ater Petitioner did not pay Mrs Cabrera
tempting to refinance Agri-Feeds while
until April 1989, after the State Bar had
also practicing law His efforts to obtain
initiated disciplinary proceedings and held $6 million in additional financing were un
an evidentiary hearing
Petitioner paid successful During this same period, peti
Mrs Cabrera a total of $6,546 ($5,546 as tioner was representing clients in 10 "ma
principal and $1,000 as interest)
jor pieces of litigation," was running a car
In addition to the evidence relating to pool for his 2 young children (who lived
Mrs Cabrera, the State Bar introduced into with his ex wife), and was making child
support and other payments to benefit his
evidence the bank records of petitioner's
children
^
trust account for the period February 1986
to February 1988 The records showed
Ten character witnesses, including two
that the account was overdrawn on several superior court judges,' testified to petition
occasions Petitioner testified that he did er's good moral character All of them had
known petitioner for a significant period of
not reconcile the bank statements, that in
dividuals whom he had hired to reconcile time They described petitioner as a hard
working competent attorney who had
his bank statements were unable to do so
been under significant financial stress as &j
and that he relied on his banker to recon
result of the problems with Agri-Feeds At
cile his eight to fifteen bank accounts
number of the vwtnesses described petition ^
1

As we have previously noted (Aromn v State
Bar (1990) 52 Cal 3d 276 290 fn 4 276 Cal
Rptr 160 801 P2d 403) canon 2B of the Call
forma Code of Judicial Conduct states that

Judges should not testify voluntarily as charac
ter witnesses
(Cal Code Jud Conduct canon
2B In re Rivas (1989) 49 Cal 3d 794 798 fn 6
263 Cal Rptr 654 781 P 2d 946)

GRIM v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Cal

943

Cite a. 805 P-2d 941 (Cal 1991)

er's misappropriation as aberrational Sev
en of the witnesses testified that they were
not aware of petitioner's prior discipline
until shortly before the hearing Four of
these seven witnesses did not learn of peti
tioner's failure to make restitution until
they were questioned at the hearing All
oft these witnesses however, maintained
that in their opinion petitioner was of good
moral character
Petitioner also presented three letters
from former clients attesting to his good
character
C

State Bar Proceedings and Recom
mendations
The hearing panel, consisting of a single
referee, cited petitioner's prior discipline as
an aggravating factor In mitigation the
referee listed these eight circumstances
(1) petitioner's candor with the State Bar
(2) petitioner s stipulation to having violat
ed former Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 8-101(B)(4) (duty to promptly pay or
deliver client funds), and Business and Pro
fessions Code sections 6068 (duties of attor
neys) and 6103 (violation of oath), (3) peti
tioner's restitution to Mrs Cabrera, (4) the
aberrational nature of petitioner's conduct,
(5) the absence of other complaints against
petitioner, (6) the severe financial stress to
which petitioner was subjected as a result
of the near failure of Agri-Feeds, (7) the
testimony of the ten character witnesses,
and (8) the three client letters The referee
recommended that petitioner be suspended
from the practice of law for tm-ee years,
that the suspension be stayed and that
petitioner be placed on probation for five
years subject to conditions that included
actual suspension for six months
The review department, by a vote of 12
to 2, adopted the referee's findings with
certain modifications It deleted the ref
eree's conclusions with respect to aggrava
tion, and substituted a brief recitation of
the facts relating to petitioner s prior disci
phne The review department also deter
mined that "[i]n misappropriating the
funds of Ms Cabrera, [petitioner] took ad
vantage of a family friend who was resid
ing m Tennessee and who accordingly was
at a disadvantage with respect to protect
mg her interests ' The review department

deleted the referee s second third, fourth
fifth, sixth, and eighth factors in mitiga
tion, and stated that most of petitioner s
character witnesses were surprised to learn
at the hearing that the funds had not been
repaid It added a finding that petitioner
had candidly admitted the misappropriation
to his client and a finding that petitioner
was guilty of gross neglect in the manage
ment of his client trust funds
In recommending disbarment the review
department relied on the Standards for At
torney Sanctions for Professional Miscon
duct (Transitional Rules Proc of State Bar
div V all further references to stand irds
are to these provisions) The review dt
partment concluded that compelling miti
gating circumstances did not clearly pre
dominate and it disregarded petitioner s
restitution as a mitigating factor because
the restitution was not made until after the
hearing in this case It gave little weight
to petitioner's character witnesses because
of their "mistaken belief that [petitioner]
had promptly returned Ms Cabrera s
funds " It rejected petitioner s defense of
financial stress because the defense did not
meet the criteria of standard 1 2(e)(iv) for
extreme emotional difficulty and because
the defense was "very questionable as an
acceptable factor in mitigation
It did
however consider petitioner s candor as a
mitigating consideration
II

DISCUSSION

Petitioner wilfully misappropriated his
client's funds
Misappropriation is more
than a grievous breach of professional eth
ICS It violates basic notions of honesty
and endangers public confidence in the le
gal profession {Chang v State Bar (1989)
49 Cal 3d 114 128 260 Cal Rptr 280 775
P2d 1049, Kelly v State Bar (1988) 45
Cal 3d 649, 656 247 Cal Rptr 608 754 P 2d
1104) In all but the most exceptional of
cases, it requires the imposition of the
harshest discipline {Chang v State Bar
supra, 49 Cal 3d at p 128 260 Cal Rptr
280, 775 P2d 1049 Gordon v State Bar
(1982) 31 Cal 3d 748 757, 183 Cal Rptr 861
647 P 2d 137 ) The seriousness of the of
fense and the propriety of disbarment as
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the appropriate discipline have long been
recognized by this court (In re Ford (1988)
44 Cal 3d 810, 816, 244 Cal Rptr 476, 749
P2d 1331, and cases cited) and are re
fleeted in the standards Standard 2 2(a)
provides that wilful misappropriation of en
trusted funds shall result in disbarment
unless the amounts are insignificant or the
most compelling mitigating circumstances
clearly predominate
We recently observed that the term wil
ful misappropriation ' as used in attorney
discipline cases, "covers a broad range of
conduct varying significantly in the degree
of culpability ' and that
[djisbarment
would rarely, if ever be an appropriate
discipline for an attorney whose only mis
conduct was a single act of negligent mis
appropnation, unaccompanied by acts of
deceit or other aggravating factors ' (Ed
wards v State Bar (1990) 52 Cal 3d 28, 38
276 Cal Rptr 153, 801 P 2d 396 ) The mis
appropriation in this case, however, was
not the result of carelessness or mistake,
petitioner acted deliberately and with full
knowledge that the funds belonged to his
client Moreover, the evidence supports an
inference that petitioner intended to perma
nently deprive his client of her funds peti
tioner repaid the funds only after the pas
sage of almost three years and then only
under the pressure of these disciplinary
proceedings Standard 2 2(a) is properly
applied to such grave misconduct
[1J The standards and the recommenda
tion of the review department are entitled
to great weight (In re Naney (1990) 51
Cal 3d 186, 190, 270 Cal Rptr 848, 793 P 2d
54) When, as here, the review depart
ment's recommendation is consistent with
the standards, we generally will not reject
the recommendation unless we entertain
grave doubts about its propriety (See
e g , Hawes v State Bar (1990) 51 Cal 3d
2

Petitioners argument that in determining dis
cipline we must resolve all reasonable doubts in
his favor is incorrect The rule that culpability
in State Bar proceedings must be established by
convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and
that reasonable doubts must be resolved in fa
vor of the attorney (Price v Stare Bar (1982) 30
Cal 3d 537 547 179 Cai Rptr 914 638 P 2d
1311 Emslie v State Bar (1974) 11 Cal 3d 210
226 113 Cal Rptr 175 520 P 2d 991) is inapph
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587, 595, 274 Cal Rptr 2, 797 P 2d 1180, In
re Rivas, supra, 49 Cal 3d 794, 800, 263
Cal Rptr 654, 781 P 2d 946) The attorney
bears the burden of demonstrating that the
recommendation is erroneous or unlawful
(Bus & Prof Code § 6083, subd (c)) 2

questioned the propriety of financial stress
as a factor in mitigation Petitioner cites
certain decisions by this court for the prop
osition that financial stress may be con
sidered in mitigation, and he argues that
standard 1 2(e)(iv) is inapplicable here

Petitioner does not contend that the
amount he misappropnated>($5 546) was in
significant (See Lawhorn v State Bar
(1987) 43 Cal 3d 1357, 1361, 1368, 240 Cal
Rptr 848 743 P 2d 908 [$1,355 75 held to
be a significant amount]) Yet he asserts
that the recommended discipline of disbar
ment is excessive Thus the issue before
us is whether petitioner has* shown that
'the most compelling mitigating circum
stances clearly predominate
" (Std
2 2(a))

[2] Financial problems can be a mitigat
ing factor in appropriate State Bar disciph
nary cases (See e g Amante v State
Bar (1990) 50 Cal 3d 247 254, 266 Cal Rptr
648 786 P 2d 375, Bradpiece v State Bar
(1974) 10 Cal 3d 742 747 111 Cal Rptr 905
518 P 2d 337 ) In misappropriation cases
financial problems are given significant
weight in mitigation only if they are ex
treme and result from circumstances *hat
are not reasonably foreseeable or that are
beyond the attorney s control
(In re Na
ney supra 51 Cal 3d at p 196 270 Cal
Rptr 848 793 P 2d 54 ) Financial difficul
ties exist in virtually all misappropriation
cases for the simple reason that it is usual
ly the attorney s need or desire for money
that is the motivation for stealing client
funds Unless our consideration of an at
torney's financial pressures as a mitigating
factor is confined to circumstances not rea
sonably foreseeable or beyond the attor
ney s control the rule prohibiting misap
propnation and the substantial protection
it affords the public, will be largely nulli
fied It is precisely when the attorney s
need or desire for funds is greatest that
the need for the public protection afforded
by the rule prohibiting misappropriation is
greatest (See e g Amante v State Bar
supra, 50 Cal 3d at p 255 266 Cal Rptr
648 786 P2d 375, Smith v State Bar
(1985) 38 Cal 3d 525 540-541 213 Cal Rptr
236 698 P 2d 139 )

In challenging the review department's
recommendation of disbarment, petitioner
argues that it deleted from the referee's
decision certain findings in mitigation that
were supported by sufficient evidence, and
that it made conclusions regarding aggra
vating circumstances that were not supported by the evidence A discussion of
petitioner's contentions follows
A

Mitigating

Circumstances

Petitioner contends the review depart
ment failed to accord appropriate weight in
mitigation to his severe financial stress, the
absence «of complaints or misconduct re
ported to the State Bar other than his prior
discipline, the aberrational nature of his
misconduct his restitution to Mrs Cabrera,
his cooperation in the State Bar proceed
mgs, and the testimony of his character
witnesses
In rejecting petitioner's financial stress
as a mitigating factor, the review depart
ment cited standard 1 2(e)(iv)3 and, inde
pendent of the reference to this standard
cable to the issue of appropriate discipline
Culpability is not in issue in this case
3

GRIM v STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Standard 1 2(e)(iv) says that severe emotional
difficulties may be a mitigating circumstance if
it is established by expert testimony and the
attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that he no longer suffers from the
difficulties

Petitioner s reliance on financial stress
as a mitigating factor is misplaced His
financial difficulties were neither unfore
seeable nor beyond his control It was the
near failure of Agri-Feeds petitioner s
business venture that was primarily re
sponsible for petitioner s stress As men
tioned earlier the purpose of Agri-Feeds
of which petitioner owns 98 percent of the
4

Because petitioner has not shown that finan
cial stress should be considered as a mitigating
factor in this case a discussion of the review

stock, is to convert waste agricultural eel
lulose into animal food It is a novel enter
prise using untested technology The risk
of financial failure was reasonably foresee
able by petitioner Indeed Agri-Feeds hid
closed twice once in 1983 and once in 1985
before petitioner misappropriated Mrs Ca
brera s money Petitioner controlled his
business venture
Petitioner fin inced
Agri-Feeds through loans secured by his
real estate holdings and personal guaran
ties Under these circumstances petition
er s financial problems are not entitled to
significant weight in mitigation '
Petitioner argues that except for the
1980 prior discipline and the present disci
phnary matter he has committed no mis
conduct since his admission to the State
Bar in 1966 and that this should be con
sidered a mitigating circumstance He also
points out that a number of his chiracter
witnesses testified that his misippropni
tion in this case was aberrational I t h m o r
Petitioners private rtproval in 19S0 w is
based on a stipulation as to facts and disci
pline The stipulation cited as a mitigating
circumstance the fact that petitioner had
practiced law since 1966 without prior disci
pline Thus before these proceedings the
length of petitioner s practice and the ab
sence of complaints from clients art cir
cumstances that have alreadv been relied
on to justify the imposition of a lesser
degree of discipline The prior discipline
was imposed for petitioner s commingling
of client funds and his failure to perform
services Commingling like misappropm
tion (the misconduct involved here) is a
serious offense involving funds entrusted
to an attorney (Std 2 2(a) & (b)) Al
though petitioner minimizes the signifi
cance of his prior discipline it is an aggra
vating factor
(Stds 1 2(b)(i) 17) Be
cause of the similarity between and the
seriousness of petitioner s 1980 misconduct
and the present misconduct we reject peti
tioner s contention
[3] Petitioner also contends his restitu
tion of Mrs Cabrera s funds should be
departments conclusion that pet t o u r s c\
dence did not satisfy the requ rements of stan
dard 1 2(e)(iv) is unnecessary
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considered as mitigating Petitioner, howto these witnesses before the heanng diever, did not make the payment until after
minishes the weight to be accorded the
he had been contacted by Mrs Cabrera's
testimony of these witnesses The testimoTennessee attorneys and after the State
ny is, nevertheless, entitled to considerable
Bar had commenced disciplinary proceedweight because even after learning of petiings Restitution paid under the force or
tioner's failure to restore the misapproprithreat of disciplinary proceedings is not a
ated funds, the character witnesses mainproper mitigating circumstance
{Hitchtained that petitioner possessed good moral
cock v State Bar (1989) 48 Cal 3d 690, 709,
character
257 CalRptr 696, 771 P 2d 394)
Petitioner correctly argues that the re
view department erred in deleting the referee's finding that petitioner's admission of
violation of the former Rules of Profession
al Conduct and Business and Professions
Code sections constituted a mitigating cir
cumstance It is true that cooperation with
the State Bar during its investigation and
proceedings is a mitigating factor (Std
12(e)(v))

B

Aggravating

Circumstances

Petitioner challenges the review department's finding, in aggravation, that he took
advantage of a family friend who was residing in another state and thus was at a
disadvantage with respect to protecting her
interests Petitioner also challenges the
review department's finding that he was
guilty of gross neglect m the management
of his trust funds and office accounts Petitioner maintains that the review department's findings are not within the charges
set forth in the notice to show cause and
are not supported by the findings of the
hearing panel

As noted earlier, 10 character witnesses
testified on behalf of petitioner at the hear
mg Among them were two superior court
judges and one lawyer The remaining
seven witnesses were business associates
or business people who had known petition
er for some time Several of the witnesses
1 Notice to Show Cause
testified that petitioner had performed le
An
attorney cannot be disciplined for a
gal work for them The referee cited the
testimony of the character witnesses in violation not alleged in the notice to show
mitigation The review department, how- cause If the evidence shows an ethical
ever, gave little weight to the testimony in violation not charged in the notice, the
State Bar must amend the notice to con
light of the witnesses' "mistaken belief
form to proof A slight variance in the
that petitioner had promptly returned Mrs
evidence that relates to the noticed charge,
Cabrera's funds
however, does not require an amendment
Petitioner contends the review depart- unless the attorney demonstrates that the
ment failed to give sufficient weight to the defense was actually compromised
(Van
testimony of his character witnesses We
Sloten v State Bar (1989) 48 Cal 3d 921,
agree that the review department appears
928-929, 258 Cal Rptr 235, 771 P 2d 1323)
to have discounted this testimony too
Furthermore, although evidence of unmuch But we do not agree that the testicharged misconduct cannot be used as an
mony established mitigation of a most comindependent ground of discipline, it may be
pelling nature
considered when it is otherwise relevant to
[4] The record shows that four of the an issue in the proceeding {Arm v State
ten character witnesses, including one of Bar (1990) 50 Cal 3d 763, 775, 268 Cal Rptr
741, 789 P 2d 922 )
the two judges, were unaware that petition
er had failed to make restitution to Mrs
The review department's finding that pe
Cabrera by the time of the hearing Thus,
titioner took advantage of Mrs Cabrera as
an appreciable number of petitioner's wit
nesses did not know the full extent of a family friend residing in another state
petitioner's misconduct
(Std 12(e)(vi)) and its finding that he mismanaged his
Petitioner's failure to make full disclosure trust account were not used as independent
grounds of discipline but as circumstances
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in aggravation Factors in aggravation in
elude indifference toward rectifying the
consequences of the misconduct (Std
1 2(b)(v)) and lack of cooperation with the
victim of the misconduct (Std 1 2(b)(vi))
The evidence of petitioner's mismanage
ment of his trust account was also relevant
to a factor in aggravation
Standard
1 2(b)(u) provides that it shall be considered
an aggravating factor "that the current
misconduct found or acknowledged by the
member evidences multiple acts of wrong
doing or demonstrates a pattern of miscon
duct " Petitioner was charged with misap
propnating client funds from his trust ac
count He stipulated that he took Mrs
Cabrera's money for his own use He also
testified at the hearing that his trust ac
count was overdrawn on several occasions
And he testified that neither he nor mdivid
uals whom he had hired were able to recon
cile his bank statements The review de
partment properly considered this evidence
2

Heanng Panel Findings and Suffi
ciency of Evidence

Petitioner asserts that the review depart
ment's findings in aggravation are not sup
ported by the findings of the hearing panel
The argument is without merit The re
view department has the authority to
"adopt findings, conclusions and a decision
or recommendation at variance with the
hearing department " (Transitional Rules
Proc of State Bar, rule 453(a)) Because
the review department has such authority,
we will deem petitioner's assertion to be a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the review department's find
mgs in aggravation
We agree with petitioner that the record
does not support the review department's
finding that Mrs Cabrera was a family
friend of petitioner The record merely
shows that before the misconduct in this
case petitioner represented Dr and Mrs
Cabrera in some legal matters that Mrs
Cabrera would inquire about petitioner s
children, and that she invited petitioner to
see her in Tennessee if he happened to be
in that state for a visit These instances do

not support the review department s find
mg that Mrs Cabrera was a family friend
The record does, however, support the
review department's finding that petitioner
took advantage of Mrs Cabrera s move to
Tennessee after her husband s death The
record discloses that attorneys from Ten
nessee representing Mrs Cabrera contact
ed petitioner on various occasions in an
effort to obtain her funds from petitioner
Although petitioner told the attorneys he
would pay Mrs Cabrera he did not do so
until after the State Bar heanng in this
case We conclude that the review depart
ment properly considered these circum
stances as aggravating factors
(Std
1 2(b)(m))
Contrary to petitioner s assertion the re
view department properlv found that peti
tioner had exhibited gross neglect in the
management of his trust funds and office
accounts The record shows that petition
er's trust account was overdrawn on sever
al occasions and that his bink statements
could not be reconciled
C

Propriety of Discipline
[5] Petitioner contends that the recom
mended discipline of disbarment is exces
sive, unduly harsh and unnecessary He
argues that disbarment exceeds the le\el of
discipline that this court h is imposed in
comparable cases and that monitored pro
bation will adequately protect the public
interest
The extent of discipline is determined by
a balanced consideration of the rele\ant
factors (McCray v State Bar (1985) 38
Cal 3d 257, 273, 211 Cal Rptr 691 696 P 2d
83) The imposition of discipline less than
disbarment in other cases involving differ
ent facts (see, e g Lawhom v State Bar
supra, 43 Cal 3d 1357 1368 240 Cal Rptr
848, 743 P2d 908 [compelling mitigating
factors in a case falling between wilful
misappropriation and simple comming
ling"], Chasteen v State Bar (1985) 40
Cal 3d 586 592-593 220 Cal Rptr 842 709
P 2d 861 [recommended discipline in
creased]) does not lead to the conclusion
that disbarment m this case is unwarrant
ed (See, e g Chang v State Bar supra

948 Cal.

805 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

49 Cal.3d at pp. 128-129, 260 Cal.Rptr. 280,
775 P.2d 1049 [disbarment based on single
misappropriation]; In re Demergian (1989)
48 Cal.3d 284, 289, 298, 256 Cal.Rptr. 392,
768 P.2d 1069 [disbarment based on theft
of client funds]; In re Abbott (1977) 19
Cal.3d 249, 251, 254, 137 Cal.Rptr. 195, 561
P.2d 285 [same].)
Petitioner has not shown that the review
department's recommendation of disbarment is erroneous or unlawful. Petitioner's cooperation with the State Bar and
evidence of his good character do not constitute compelling mitigation in view of the
various circumstances in aggravation. Petitioner misappropriated Mrs. Cabrera's
$5,546. He has a prior disciplinary record.
He did not make restitution, despite the
efforts of Mrs. Cabrera's Tennessee attorneys to obtain her funds, until after the
State Bar's evidentiary hearing. He took
advantage of the fact that Mrs. Cabrera
resided in another state and placed his interests over those of his client.
Because disbarment is warranted, it is
not necessary to address the possibility of
prophylactic measures, such as the imposition of a probation monitor, that may be
appropriate when lesser forms of discipline
are warranted.
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referee recommended five years' probatior
that included six months' actual suspension
and other conditions.
The petitioner was guilty of one actf6f
misappropriation. Unquestionably it was
serious and caused inconvenience to .the
client affected thereby. However this was'
one isolated incident and jn no way indicates a course of conduct. Since a private'
reproval 11 years ago the petitioner has
been free of improper or unprofessional
practice.
Under these circumstances disbarment
impresses me as excessive punishment unnecessary for the protection of the public.

CO I KEV NUMBER $YST[M>

53 Ca!.3d 1
In re Ralph J. LEARDO on
Disbarment.
No. S013350.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.

DISPOSITION
March 14, 1991.
It is ordered that Douglas Paul Grim be
disbarred from the practice of law in California, that his name be stricken from the
Attorney disciplinary proceeding was
roll of attorneys, that he comply with rule
brought. The Review Department of the
955 of the California Rules of Court, and
State Bar Court recommended disbarment,
that he perform the acts specified in subdibut the Supreme Court held that convicvisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and
tions of possessing controlled substances
40 days, respectively, after the effective
with intent to distribute warrant five-year
date of this order. Failure to comply with suspension from practice of law, with order
rule 955 may result in imprisonment. (Bus. stayed on stringent conditions of probation,
& Prof.Code, § 6126, subd. (c).) This order m light of mitigating evidence and evidence
is effective upon the finality of this deci- of rehabilitation.
sion in this court. (See Cal.Rules of Court,
rule 953(a).)
Suspended, stayed on conditions of
probation.
MOSK, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent.
1. Attorney and Client <s=>57
I would adopt the recommendation of the
While Supreme Court gives great
referee who heard the evidence and had an
opportunity to evaluate the witnesses. The weight to review department's recommendation of attorney discipline, Court exercis-

es its independent judgment in determining
proper discipline to impose.
2. Attorney and Client <£=>58
Convictions of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute involve
moral turpitude and serious misconduct,
warranting disbarment in the absence of
compelling
mitigating
circumstances.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and1 Control Act of 1970, § 401(a)(1), 21
U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1); West's Ann.Cal.Bus.
& Prof.Code § 6101(a).
3. Attorney and Client <S=>58
Compelling mitigating circumstances
and evidence of rehabilitation would prevent convictions of possessing controlled
substances with intent to distribute from
warranting disbarment; initial addiction to
opiates resulted from legitimate medical
treatment, rehabilitation began promptly
upon incarceration, and drug-free and alcohol-free periods following incarceration exceeded four years. Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
§ 401(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1); West's
Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6101(a).
4. Attorney and Client <s=>58, 60
Conviction of two counts of possessing
controlled substances with intent to distribute warrants suspension from practice of
law for five years, stayed only on stringent
conditions of probation, with no actual suspension required, in light of service of four
and one-half years on noncustodial interim
suspension and lack of financial profit from
drug sales made to undercover agent who
proposed and urged transactions."'Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 401(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1); West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.
Code § 6101(a); Cal.Rules of Court, Rule
953(a).
5. Attorney and Client <S=*57, 58
Disciplinary standard providing that,
even when there are compelling mitigating
circumstances, discipline for conviction of
crime of moral turpitude shall not be less
than two year actual suspension, prospec1. Petitioner and the State Bar stipulated that the
case would be heard by a single referee sitting

tive to any interim suspension, is simply
guideline for use by State Bar, and whether recommended discipline is appropriate is
still matter for Supreme Court's independent review. State Bar Procedure Rule
611; West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code
§ 6002.1.

George V. Denny, III, Sherman Oaks, for
petitioner.
Edwin T. Caldwell, San Francisco, Theodore A. Cohen, Beverly Hills, David B.
Johnson and Quattrin, Johnson, Campora
and England, Sacramento, as amici curiae
on behalf of petitioner.
Diane C. Yu, Richard J. Zanassi, Starr
Babcock and Mara Mamet, San Francisco,
for respondent.
THE COURT:
We review the recommendation of the
Review Department of the State Bar Court
(hereafter review department) that petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law in
California because of his 1985 conviction in
the Virgin Islands on two counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to
distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). As will
appear, we conclude that a less severe form
of discipline will better recognize the compelling evidence of mitigation and rehabilitation in this record, will amply protect
the public and the profession, and will promote consistency with a recent decision of
this court on very similar facts (In re Madrich (1988) 44 Cal.3d 271, 243 Cal.Rptr 218,
747 P.2d 1146).
In March 1986 petitioner voluntarily initiated these proceedings by informing the
State Bar of his conviction in the Virgin
Islands and asking that he be placed on
interim suspension.
Accordingly, we
placed him on such suspension effective
May 30, 1986, and referred the matter to
the State Bar for a hearing and recommendation as to discipline.1 During the years
1987 and 1988 petitioner and the State Bar
as a hearing panel (hereafter the referee).
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ORDER AFFIRMING
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MODIFIED RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE
F-484

]

Pursuant to Rule XII(e) of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the Board has reviewed
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline of the Disciplinary Hearing
Panel.

It hereby affirms the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, adopts them as its own, and
incorporates them by reference into this Order.
The Recommendation of the Hearing Panel that
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years is disaffirmed.

The Board recommends

Respondent be disbarred.
The following Recommendations of the Hearing Panel,
as modified, are affirmed:

Respondent shall not act or hold himself out as
an attorney, paralegal or law clerk following his
disbarment.
Respondent shall be permitted to be employed as
a secretary and office manager in the law firm of George
H. Searle.
George H. Searle shall make annual reports to
the Office of Bar Counsel verifying that Respondent is
employed in his law firm and that he is not acting or
holding himself out as an attorney, paralegal or law
clerk.

Mr. Searle shall also notify the Office of Bar

Counsel when Respondent's employment with his office is
terminated.

Future employment by Respondent in any

office where the practice of law is conducted shall be
subject to the same terms and conditions.
Respondent, as a condition precedent to
readmission to practice law, shall make full restitution
to Lincoln National Corporation in the amount of
$22,500.00, plus interest, at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum.
Respondent shall make full restitution to
Unigard in Formal Complaint F-268 in an amount
satisfactory to Unigard as a condition precedent to
readmission to practice law.
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Respondent should pay the reasonable costs
incurred to the Office of Bar Counsel for prosecuting
this action in the amount of $118.32.
Formal Complaint F-485 is dismissed per
agreement of the parties.
The grounds for this modification of the
recommendations of the Disciplinary Hearing Panel are set
forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and
Authorities.
DATED this g"fu

day of

HA-ecf/

, 1993.

BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS

CA . J W Q

By:

Randy p. \Dryer
Presld

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Modified Recommendation of Discipline was
mailed certified mail return receipt requested, postal
, to George Searle,

certificate number

Attorney for Respondent, at 2805 So. State, S.L.C., UT
84115 on this l~2

day of fYla^^—,
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1993.
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